Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-96-072 *12 April 1996*

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Balkans: Bosnia Reconstruction Conference Opens in Brussels

AU1204081796 Paris AFP in English 0804 GMT 12 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, April 12 (AFP)—A key donors conference opened here Friday with officials from 55 countries ready to tackle how to finance the huge task of Bosnia's post-war reconstruction.

The two-day conference, sponsored by the European Commission and the World Bank, hopes to raise $1.8 billion for 1996.

The Bosnian Serb delegation, which was to join the Croat-Moslem Federation delegation, has refused to participate in the conference.

A total 55 countries and 29 world agencies are taking part in the meeting, against a backdrop of a new flare-up of the Balkans conflict failing quick economic measures to smooth over the tension still simmering between Bosnia's three people—the Croats, Moslems and Serbs.

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Inter-European: Prague, Warsaw To Decide on Multipurpose Plane

LD1104121596 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1000 GMT 11 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Poland and the Czech Republic will be holding talks on selecting one type of multipurpose aircraft for their air forces. Our Warsaw correspondent Miroslav Karas has further details.

[Karas] This is the outcome of the meeting between the [Czech] parliament economy committee and representatives of the Polish Industry Ministry.

Deputy Industry Minister Roman Czerwinski said the Czechs and Poles would not compete against each other and that they would cooperate. He added that the two sides would opt for one type of aircraft. Four offers are allegedly being considered: the U.S. F-16, the French Mirage, the Russian MiG-19, and the Swedish Gripen.

Polish media said the Polish side would decide by the end of the year, but Prague favored an earlier decision.

According to unofficial information, Warsaw will opt for the U.S. or Swedish aircraft.

The Polish and Czech defense ministers will discuss the modernization of the armies and, in particular, the air forces in Vyskov on 13 April. The meeting will be attended by [Czech foreign minister] Josef Zieleniec and [Polish foreign minister] Dariusz Rosati.

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Albania: Assembly Presidium Chairman Gives Address

AU1104092596 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 5 Apr 96 p 7

[Address by Pjeter Arbnori, chairman of the Presidium of the People's Assembly, to the Democratic Party Third National Assembly in Tirana on 4 April: Albania Made a Reality of Building a Western Democracy]

[FBIS Translated Text] I can report to you with pride that the Albanian Parliament during the last five years has carried out the program laid down by the Democratic Party [PD] item by item. It elected a democratic president of authority; gave a vote of confidence to and supported a stable and reforming government, which has rarely happened in the communist East; built a new system of laws that has brought the country the rule of law and political, judicial, and economic reform; established stability and calm; and taken Albania into the Council of Europe.

By the instructions of almost 2 million voters, the demise of communism and emergence of a Western-style democracy became a reality thanks to you distinguished activists and the more than 120,000 members of the PD representing citizens from Kelmendi to Permet and from Has to Konispol.

On your behalf, I wish to express gratitude to the PD parliamentary group and its chairman, Mr. Ali Spahia, for the clear-headedness, determination, and unity it maintained in a storm-tossed sea, in which any unwary person might drown or lose direction.

A few splinters detached themselves from our parliamentary group during this four-year struggle, and experience has shown that these splinters did not really belong to us but went on to achieve what they had been striving to conceal for three years by creating the Red front of communism. They will see what comes of it! They forgot Lenin's theory about the hegemony of the proletariat and the leading role of the party, and, in trying to seize its head, they will be left at its tail.

Four years ago, we said that there were two pillars of the PD: First, there are the property owners we helped to create with the laws we approved, and who number 400,000 owners of land in the countryside, 400,000 owners of apartments in the towns, hundreds of thousands of owners of shops and restituted property, and businessmen and traders who have arisen and multiplied during the four years of democracy. The second pillar consists of the hundreds of thousands of former victims of persecution, who in their struggle alongside us gained their innocence, their pride, compensation for their time in prison and internment, employment in key sectors of the administration, the police, and foreign affairs, free apartments, scholarships to previously forbidden universities, and an assurance that they have in the PD a bulwark that will once and for all prevent the return of communism, despite the many colors in which it has now disguised itself—for it has now given up red and turned all sorts of hues.

What things we see in society today!

1. The first thing is security.

a) Notice the change in the appearance of shops in the last four years. At one time, the first traders welded their shop windows with rusty grilles like cages to guard their onions, bread, and salt. Now the shops are full of goods like in all the capitals of Europe, and their owners are tearing out the rusty grilles and replacing them with tinted glass and marble. Shopkeepers are not behaving like this because the government tells them to, but because they enjoy security.

b) Look at the statistics of the banks and the savings accounts. People's deposits in leks and foreign currencies have multiplied 10, 20, and 30 times. The government is not asking you for compulsory loans to the state.

c) People go on and on, speaking their minds, and nothing happens to them. A couple of people did all they could to get into prison, but nobody paid any attention. You are allowed to talk, criticize, insult, slander, and howl. Is that not security? Only occasionally does the public health department put somebody suffering from rabies in quarantine, and he, too, is pleased that somebody listened to him and pretends to be a martyr for years on end.

2. The second thing is initiative.

a) The idea that an individual depends on the state for everything has begun to disappear, and only milksops sit and whine at the doors of offices for things they could do for themselves.

b) Private initiative has begun to blossom.

c) People now first set their brain in motion, and then their hands.

d) Courage in the market and in private initiative has increased.

e) Our refugees abroad saw and learned many good things in Europe. Albania will develop even if they apply only ten out of a hundred of these good things when they return. As for those who have picked up vices in Europe, we now have the criminal codes of Europe and must apply them.

3. The third thing is awareness.

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a) After first venting their fury, which is a natural phase of liberty, people have now begun to recognize the results that have been achieved, which are not small. There are improvements in the water supply and in electricity. Some roads are now being paved. If you count the cars, television sets, and refrigerators, people laugh at you because this is already old hat. Of course, not everybody has money to build a villa or buy a new apartment, but—do not laugh, brothers and sisters—notice that most Albanians have begun by modernizing their bathrooms with shiny tiles, a shower, and a water heater. Is this not a sign of culture?

b) People have begun to worry lest a section of the population is making a mistake and thinking of committing suicide. This unhinged section of the population has begun to separate itself naturally from the majority that are in their senses.

c) Interest in politics has increased. PD sections have grown, and new ones have been created. Phantom branches have disappeared. There are no empty seats in the halls for meetings.

d) At the meetings I have attended throughout Albania from south to north, 60 percent of the questions have been political, and 30 percent economic, while only 10 percent have concerned personal problems.

4. The fourth phenomenon is increased experience.

a) We first made an inevitable mistake. Because the extreme left blackened everything good that had been done in Albania, we made fiery speeches about Albanias successes, and this was no bad thing. In this enthusiasm, we forgot that it is not easy to build democracy, develop a market economy, and carry out total privatization, and we often made mistakes. We have now understood this, and have had the courage to look at our failings straight in the eye. If we flatter ourselves and look only at our achievements, we will lull ourselves to sleep, and you must know, brother and sister delegates, that this creates a danger of us losing.

b) In the past, we went in for rallies more than we should have done. They are necessary at moments of climax, and we will have them again. However, the most fruitful work takes place in small-scale meetings, even heart-to-heart in the family circle. This was the method we used last year to rebuild the PD, which had sunk into lethargy and had lost contact with the organs of power that it itself had created. What rally was nicer than the festive gathering in the hills near the artificial lake on the anniversary of our victory on 22 March? Instead of speeches, we had a wonderful concert with young artists. People came without being summoned and without obligation, but in response to a simple announcement, and went home very satisfied. How pathetic seem the adventurist cries of the extreme left to seize the squares. They have already been seized by boys and girls walking hand in hand, and if we oldsters are thinking of taking over these squares, we must do so only in the name of democracy.

c) The important thing is to involve all distinguished people whose voices are listened to in the mass agitation for democracy: writers, artists, actors, singers, athletes, and the winners of beauty contests. Let us hear from all those who are better off then they were yesterday and appreciate the freedom they have gained.

d) Now that we have completed this voluminous work of legislation, let us attach importance in the electoral program to enforcing the laws. This is where our work should be concentrated in the future.

Finally, I will give a few brief assessments of the opposition parties.

1. The Socialist Party [PS] wants to have it both ways, to cling to Enver and Marx and to join the market economy of Europe. This is like asking for fried ice.

2. As for the Social Democratic Party [PSD], it is well known that it was the PD that elected Mr. Skender Gjinushi, the PD chairman, with its own votes, after it withdrew its own candidate. He quickly forgot this and had the bright idea of becoming a referee between the two main parties. You cannot perform a balancing act if you list to the left. The PSD was not an appendage when it was in coalition with us, but a party with dignity. Now that that Red Front has been created, the PSD has forgotten the theory of Lenin about the leading role of the party, and, having wished to be the head, it will become the tail end of the PS.

3. The Democratic Alliance: A small group within the ruling PD sabotaged the local elections of 26 July [1992] (I am not saying that it was their fault alone), and, after criticizing us for having dropped a few percentage points, it then moved into a frontal attack. These people had previously been launching such attacks every day within the party presidium. If they had remained within our party, they would have done us incalculable damage. However, they were very full of themselves and were sure of the support of others, and this rid us of them. They left us too early and burned themselves out. They unleashed their spite at losing in the form of aggression. They described themselves as liberal-democrats, then as Christian-democrats, then as conservatives, and what not. There was only one thing that they did not say: that they hankered after the left. They voted with the extreme left, and would then turn round for a month or two and vote with us, calling themselves moderates, but

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they could not be patient any longer and they joined the Red Front. Their history is like the story of the two men who asked favors of God. The first asked for wealth, and God gave it to him. The second said to God, I want to spoil the wealth of that other man.

4. The Rightist League: Being right-wing itself, the PD has never said that the parties to the right of the spectrum are its enemies. They sometimes attack us (and there is nothing wrong in their criticizing us) but we have been tolerant, and, as the largest party with 84 deputies we have thought that they will want to keep in with us and will have no reason to keep in with the left-wing parties. However, I would say that they might damage us a little in this campaign, while they have no chance of doing themselves any good. The PD is the standard-bearer in all the three points that they support.

a) The Rightist League shouts about property, but it is we who are in fact returning property to the people.

b) The Rightist League shouts about nationalism. The PD has defended and will defend Albanian nationalism without ever running counter to the Helsinki Charter.

c) The Rightist League shouts about anticommunism.

The PD together with the former victims of persecution and the Albanian people in their political struggle have buried communism and have no intention of allowing it to rise from its grave.

I wish the PD Third National Assembly success on its work on behalf of liberty, democracy, and the progress of the Albanian people.

I have come straight from the meeting of the Judicial Commission of the Council of Europe, which, besides analyzing the achievements of democracy in many recently admitted countries, also considered the conclusions of its reporters in Albania. Much earlier prejudice and disinformation has now been dispelled and the final report is very positive about Albania. The Judicial Commission emphasized that the opposition parties behaved badly in not accepting the proposal of the parliamentary chairman Mr. Arbnori to create a parliamentary commission for the draft constitution.

The Judicial Commission of the Council of Europe also shares our opinion that Fatos Nano must be treated like any other citizen and appeals to him to cooperate with Albanian justice in his own interests.

We can conclude with great satisfaction that the Albanian authorities have now made considerable progress toward fulfilling their obligations and commitments. Nevertheless, some progress is still necessary before the assembly can complete the monitoring procedure under Order 508 on Albania.

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Bulgaria: Official Views U.S. Concern Over Arms Trade

AU1104134096 Sofia 168 CHASA in Bulgarian 8-14 Apr p 12

[Interview with Georgi Dimitrov, chief of the Foreign Ministry "International Organizations" Department, by Zoya Dimitrova; place and date not given: "The United States Does Not Allow Bulgaria in 'New Forum'"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Dimitrova] Mr. Dimitrov, according to unofficial sources, 12 hours prior to the Vienna meeting, the Romanians reached an agreement with the United States on signing an accord on exchanging information regarding the states with which the United States has problems—Libya, Iran, Iraq, Cuba, Syria, and the DPRK. The United States has already signed such an accord with Slovakia. Does the United States want to sign such an accord with Bulgaria and what is its meaning?

[Dimitrov] The United States has repeatedly expressed its wish to sign such an accord with Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Government has not yet reached a decision on this matter. There are two views among the Wassenaar countries as to the character of the control system. The first point of view is that of the United States, which thinks that the arms trade with certain destinations must be subjected to restrictions agreed upon in advance by all, and that when states have the intention to export weapons to countries subject to the restrictions, they must be obliged to inform the other parpticipant states about their intention. The other point of view is the European one, so to say, and France is the most pronounced supporter of this view. According to it, the export of weapons is a part of each country's policy in the sphere of security and defense, and thus it represents a matter of national security. Naturally, the international rules must be observed. According to this point of view, the trade with arms must not be a matter of international agreements. Wassenaar adopts a compromise position between those two points of view.

It is true that the Americans require from Bulgaria a total transparency regarding weapons deals. The United States has a certain policy regarding certain countries. According to its internal legislation, if another country enters contradictory—according to the United States—relations with the aforementioned countries, the United States can apply sanctions against this country. Since the United States could not fully impose its concept in Wassenaar, it is only natural that it now strives to assert it through bilateral relations. Russia also signed an agreement with the United States in order to become a constituent member of the "New Forum." The problem there was and remains Iran. However, it appears that the United States and Russia reached an agreement on this matter.

[Dimitrova] Does this demand for total information regarding arms deals not affect the sovereignty of the various countries?

[Dimitrov] Personally, I think that since Bulgaria expressed its willingness to join the "New Forum," it is prepared to observe the control mechanism of the organization. I think that Bulgaria should not be afraid to disclose information about everything that is legal. What I can categorically state is that Bulgaria is not trading in arms with countries on which the UN Security Council has imposed an embargo. Yes, the United States is questioning our arms deals. We are trying to answer those questions, but apparently we are not quick enough, convincing enough, and insistent enough in explaining our position. [passage omitted]

[Dimitrova] What arguments are we using in trying to overcome hesitation and doubts of the United States regarding our candidacy?

[Dimitrov] We are conducting an open dialogue with the United States, and we think that this will eliminate their reservations. The essence of the Wassenaar agreement is to eliminate ambiguous situations. The Wassenaar control mechanism is a mechanism of cooperation, rather than embargo. It is subject to general principles and criteria of mutual information, transparency, and cooperation.

It is a fact that cooperation in the field of goods and technologies of dual use is greater than cooperation in the field of arms trade. So far Bulgaria has not been required to answer any questions regarding the goods and technologies of dual use, and there have been no doubts. There have been some questions regarding presumed deals with arms. [passage omitted]

[Dimitrova] To what degree has the door to the "New Forum" been closed for us?

[Dimitrov] I want to believe that we are close to membership in the "New Forum." This is one of our government's foreign policy priorities. No one has said that the door has been closed. This is a technical-operational rather than political issue. It was not by chance that a delegation of our experts has been invited to visit the United States at the end of April and discuss those issues. We also expect Mr. Engering to visit Bulgaria after the Vienna meeting. The dialogue is continuing, and no door has closed.

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Bulgaria: Videnov Accuses Zhelev of 'Sabotage'

AU1204100796 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 12 Apr 96 p 1

["DUMA PRESS" report: "Holding Up Laws Is Unprecedented Sabotage"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We are witnessing unprecedented sabotage on the part of certain interested circles, directed against our common efforts as a nation to stabilize our country's legal system, institutions, and finances. The most scandalous thing is the role that Mr. Zhelev, our head of state, has elected to play in this theatrical spectacle, Prime Minister Zhan Videnov stated on Bulgarian National Television and Radio last night. From the prime minister's words, it emerged that his statement was provoked by the latest decrees issued by the president, by which he returned the recently adopted taxation and financial laws to parliament for reconsideration.

Videnov described as the utter limit of demagogy the president's appeal to people not to pay their taxes. Despite this, Videnov said, the president called for rises in pensions, salaries, and state subsidies, and advised people to conceal their incomes; he mocked the police for their smashed-up Lada cars and demanded that the state withdraw from agriculture, yet reproached the state for failing to guarantee bread and animal feed supplies; he condemned the arms trade and incited the arms workers to strike. For years on end, he has been urging the licensing of dozens of pseudobanks, yet he ended with blaming the government for the losses incurred by the victims of the pyramid scams, Videnov declared. In the prime minister's view, it is impossible to explain this combination of slogans, which in fact represent a public appeal for us to work against ourselves.

From the prime minister's statement it emerged that the amendments to the laws will not impact upon the young family living in a small apartment nor on the 2 million pensioners with incomes below the taxable minimum, but will affect the wealthy owners of restituted properties and the multimillionaires in private business. In the prime minister's opinion, it is high time for the private companies, like the state enterprises, to assume their obligations to society by paying a profits tax that is at least drawing a little closer to the European standards. He believes that we cannot economize on energy and invest in the energy industry like the Europeans if we maintain the lowest energy prices in Europe. Videnov reminded his audience that taxes provide the money for health care, education, communal services, pensions, student grants, social benefits, as well as for the army, police, and the courts. The government has disentangled the intricate knots tied by its predecessors and is carrying out true reforms, the prime minister said, stressing that the trials of the difficult and painful changes are combined with a desire to ensure that they are fairly shared. Videnov gave an assurance that the cabinet will act in a pragmatic and socially responsible manner, despite the lies. He said that according to an incomplete check carried out in great haste, Zhelev has returned no fewer that seven laws since the Democratic Left assumed office.

Bulgaria: Pressure To Complete Belene Nuclear Plant Noted

AU1004161896 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 10 Apr 96 p 6

[Commentary by Engineer Viktoriya Velinska: "Backwards to the Bright Future Through the Belene Nuclear Power Station"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We are witnessing unforgivable pressure being applied by domestic and foreign forces to complete construction of the Belene nuclear power station (or of the 1,000-megawatt first reactor unit, at least) and "to develop the gas power industry." This is happening despite the program that the government has adopted, based on the energy strategy proposed by consensus by all the country's acknowledged specialists, which includes well founded priorities. These priorities, at least until 2010-12, do not include either the Belene nuclear power station or the "gas power industry." Quite the contrary, all the versions of the projects, including those specially commissioned, prove the opposite, namely that they bring no economic benefit and are technically unfeasible.

The pressure to build the Belene nuclear power station is more than brutal and is being exerted in the absence of any official stocktaking of what has been completed so far at the site and without any technical or economic study showing the final costs of completing the project, the fuel costs, the expected prime cost of the electricity to be produced in the future, the amortization period needed to recoup the costs of the plant, and so forth....

Furthermore, no ideas have been put forward about how to settle the existing unsolved problems with the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Station, the necessary licensing of the site has not been completed, and no expert ecological study has been commissioned. What is more, not a single document or technical or economic argument has been presented at any forum in support of constructing the Belene nuclear power station. The only argument cited is the approximately $1.2 billion that has been "invested" to date. On the basis of this and the presumed, but completely unproven, end cost of the project, it is claimed that, for a further

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expenditure of "only" $1.4 billion, we will get no less than 1,000 megawatts! Nevertheless, at least four official documents exist that show that the amounts "invested" are $630 million, $750 million, $970 million, and, finally, $1.2 billion! No one disputes that a lot of money has been spent on the project, but how much of it has been "invested"? Does the difference between the two concepts of investment and expenditure lie behind the insistent haste to start new construction work? It is no accident that all the active participants in the campaign were among those that previously took an active part in the Belene investment process.

Nonetheless, this is the most innocent presumption, even though the issue concerns hundreds of millions of dollars. The program that the government has adopted also provides funds to pay for the equipment already delivered and declared to date. It is for the prosecution service to determine whether the application was made prior or subsequently to the moratorium on the Belene project, that is, whether or not a crime has been committed. Since the project is a state one, with a state guarantee, the deliveries will be paid for sooner or later. In this way, the interests of the suppliers are bound to be satisfied, at least in the main. Yes, and no!

Other motives exist for the exceptionally strong foreign pressure to complete the Belene plant. The whole of the Bulgarian public is well aware that the addition of a further 1,000-megawatt generating unit to our electricity grid is not only unnecessary, but also impossible in terms of the system's stability and security. The specialists are unanimous on this point. However, this will be possible if our national power grid is connected, for example, to Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine, and so on. True, this will entail further large investment, because the existing 750-kilovolt long-distance power line lacks sufficient transmission capacity. However, surely we should link up with UCPTE [expansion unknown], the European power system? Of course, the lobbyists reply, no one has denied Bulgaria's pro-European priorities (in words, at least!) and we will use "direct current connection links" ["pravotokovi vstavki"]. However, to rely on direct current connection links for the long-term transfer of electricity is an utterly ridiculous idea, whose true absurdity can only be assessed by the specialists. Of course, one also relies on one last resort. The rosy prospects for linking the Bulgarian national power grid with the above-listed countries "fortuitously" coincides with the threat made to NATO that [illegible]ia may install missile sites... in Bulgaria, as well as [illegible] the invitation to our country to join USSR-2.

However, there is also another point that is of greater consequence. If the Belene nuclear power station is completed, this will act against the project to develop the Maritsa-Iztok thermoelectric power stations, which is most favorable for Bulgaria from the economic and ecological points of view.

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Czech Republic: Commentary Faults Klaus Visit to Belgrade

96CH0080A Prague RESPEKT in Czech 11-17 Mar 96 p 2

[Commentary by Teodor Marjanovic: "A Little Get-Together With Milosevic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus is noted for liking to hear how pragmatic and open a politician he is. At the beginning of last week, during his visit to Belgrade, he surely heard this many times: His aversion to a "black-and-white evaluation, indicating that the culprit is here and the victim there," or his statements on the "inability to determine the measure of guilt for causing the war in the Balkans," a statement that sounded sweet to the ears of the Belgrade politicians, had to take credit for this. The Serbian politicians greatly value those few rare personalities who do not turn their backs on them. In addition to Klaus, these include Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, and Vladimir Meciar.

Meciar, who, according to the Bratislava progovernment newspaper NARODNA OBRODA, also "never looked for a guilty party in the fratricidal war in Yugoslavia," visited Serbia at the beginning of February. He brought with him a 60-member delegation of entrepreneurs and, upon his return, characterized his journey as a political and economic triumph.

One month later, Klaus was somewhat more modest and made no secret of the fact that the penetration of the devastated Yugoslav market constitutes a unique opportunity for Czech enterprises.

He is correct: Good business can surely be conducted in one of the most bolshevized countries in Europe, over which the specter of renewed economic sanctions continues to hang, where, until recently, they were struggling with the greatest degree of inflation since Weimar Germany, in a country where policies are determined by war profiteers, in a country where we would have a difficult time looking for signs of a state of law, and a country that will for a long time to come not see a surge of foreign investments and loans. Such a country surely is worthy of the visit by the Czech prime minister.

Even the timing of the visit was a success. One day before the arrival of the Czech special, the congress of the governing Serbian Communist Party—a party that had been renamed the Socialist Party several years ago—ended in Belgrade. With 99.9 percent of the votes, Slobodan Milosevic was again elected to head that party. According to information from the location of the event, everything here was precisely reminiscent of pictures taken at congresses of the KSC [Communist Party of Czechoslovakia], which were recently presented on Czech Television in the form of contemporary documents.

The 10-minute ovations, the red flags, the red decorations, the singing of "The International" by all delegates. And, of course, the fiery speech of the newly elected chairman about how Serbia, thanks to the self-sacrifices of the heroic Serbian people, survived years of unjust economic sanctions and still managed to prove able to "provide material-moral assistance to all Serbs in need, particularly those who had to confront the horrors of war with weapons in hand."

Of course, one day later, during the little get-together on the sofa in Milosevic's presidential halls, the Czech guest was more likely to hear how his hosts are condemning the warmongering agitations of Karadzic: After all, they are attempting to defend the most peace-loving policies in the Balkans, and that is why already some time ago, as His Excellency Prime Minister Klaus certainly knows, they decided to temporarily halt all material and moral assistance to the Bosnian Serb regime.

The hallmark of the Vaclav Klaus visit provided the Milosevic power self-confirmation with a special sheen. And not only that: For the Serbian president, the fact that he was receiving a famous and respected guest who was not regarding him as a mass murderer weaned from bolshevism had to have a certain appeal. He obviously did not see a single sign of hesitation in the eyes of Klaus over the fact that it still is not yet certain whether the International Tribunal in The Hague will issue an arrest warrant for him. The Czech prime minister obviously did not radiate any bashfulness but, rather, a certain admiration. During his journey, Vaclav Klaus said of the Serbian president that "this is a politician who believes in himself with respect to many a matter, who has a certain charisma with respect to his citizens, and who, thanks to his past, his business and banking activities, has a certain inclination toward a pragmatic view of things."

If only Havel were not there, Milosevic surely mentally complained when he was ascertaining the possibilities for purchasing Czech streetcars. His counterpart, who was readily analyzing the production plans of the Tatra Plant at Zlicin, was able to gleefully rub his hands behind his back and most likely relish the idea of how beautifully he had put one over on Havel this time.

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Czech Republic: Holan's Concept on Military Districts Rejected

AU1204082896 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 11 Apr 96 p 2

[Report by "(drb)": "Holan Has Failed With More Material"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The government rejected a concept for the development and utilization of the military districts submitted to it yesterday by Defense Minister Vilem Holan. According to Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, the material was not, in the end, as interesting and conceptual as it would appear from its title. Therefore, Holan was given the task of submitting a completely new and genuinely conceptual document.

According to the prime minister, the requested material should determine, among other things, what size military districts the Czech Republic, in view of its dimensions and military ambitions, really needs. Klaus added that many government members feel that the current military districts are rather too large. The material submitted did not deal with the districts as a whole but merely shaved off certain territory from them. But this involved only 4 percent of their total area. Such a course of action, according to Klaus, really is not conducive to achieving the objective.

Czech Republic: Parties Submit Economic Performance Reports

AU1204093096 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 11 Apr 96 p 3

[Article by "(pra)": "The LSNS Had the Largest Income Last Year"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The wealthiest political party at the end of last year was the then Liberal National Social Party [LSNS], with income amounting to more than 89 million korunas [Kc]. The Civic Democratic Party [ODS] (Kc80 million), the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] (almost Kc62 million), the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia [KSCM], the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party [KDU-CSL], and the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA] came next. According to the annual reports on the political parties' economic performance, which a Chamber of Deputies supervisory subcommittee discussed yesterday in harmony with the law on association in political parties, it is apparent, however, that the sources of the individual political entities' income differ substantially. Part of the income is covered by the state contribution for the political parties' activity. Its amount is associated with the 1992 election results and with the size of the parliamentary clubs. In the case of the ODS, this involved Kc36.8 million; the state subsidy covered completely the Left Bloc's [LB] economic performance and most of the expenditure of the Bohemian-Moravian Union of the Center [CMUS] and the Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia [SPR-RSC].

The not terribly large LSNS obtained Kc66 million by selling bonds, and, like the CSSD, a considerable amount of its income came from leasing buildings. The KSCM, on the other hand, bases its economic performance on regular contributions from its sizable membership base—in 1995, it obtained about Kc26 million this way. The extraparliamentary Democratic Union [DEU] was also dependent on members' contributions. The ODS received just under Kc8.0 million in members' contributions; sponsors contributed three times this sum to its account. The Association of Employers donated Kc3.2 million, and the Czechpol and Zlinstav companies donated Kc0.5 million each. Two individuals, Lajos Bacs from Budapest and Radjiv M. Sinha from Mauritius, supported the ODS by donating the largest amounts. Each of them sent it Kc3.75 million. Of Czech citizens, the most generous to this party was Miloslav Schejbal, with Kc3.5 million. ODA received more than Kc3.3 million from the TMC company in Vaduz. The KDU-CSL received about Kc1.0 million from Coutts and Co. AG Zurich.

The majority of the parties, however, regardless of the outcome of their economic performance last year, have debts. The ODS and ODA have the largest debts, while the KSCM and the LB have none. Forty-eight of the 86 Czech political entities submitted the annual reports on their financial situation within the legal deadline.

Economic Performance of Political Parties in 1995 (in millions of Kc)

	Income	State Contribution	Financial Gifts	Expenditures	Total Debt
ODS	80.207	36.833	24.904	82.548	52.049
ODA	25.642	12.500	3.284	16.956	51.860

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	Income	State Contribution	Financial Gifts	Expenditures	Total Debt
KDU-CSL	44.906	12.500	1.347	53.305	29.078
KDS	7.181	5.667	0.047	7.106	00.000
CSSD	61.792	14.000	0.236	53.385	37.793
KSCM	61.755	6.470	00.000	66.493	00.000
LB	15.341	14.880	0.002	4.876	00.000
CMUS	10.654	9.500	0.018	10.784	00.000
SPR-RSC	10.597	9.000	0.180	7.787	3.229
SD	7.541	3.336	0.614	11.371	7.509
LSNS	89.266	3.750	0.097	103.315	11.458
DEU	1.347	00.000	0.181	1.486	0.433

NOTE: KDS = Christian Democratic Party; SD = Free Democrats

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Slovakia: Government Reaction to Kovac's PRC Visit Noted

AU1104144596 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 11 Apr 96 p 1

[Report by Ivan Horsky: "President Michal Kovac Arrived in Beijing"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Beijing—Slovak President Michal Kovac with his wife and entourage arrived in Beijing for a state visit last night. [passage omitted] The official part of the visit is starting today.

During the 19-hour flight, the president's TU 154 M made two stopovers. In Abu Dhabi, he was greeted in the name of the president of the United Arab Emirates by R. Bin-Salim Bin-Rakkad, minister of construction and public works and acting minister of oil and mineral resources, and in Calcutta, India, he was greeted in the name of the government of the federal state of West Bengal by its cabinet chief in the rank of minister, N. Krishnamurthy.

These meetings, though only of courtesy nature, highly exceeded the official farewell with Michal Kovac in Bratislava on 9 April when not a single member of the Slovak Government came to the airport to see him off. The government was represented only by Jan Repasky, head of the Defense Ministry's office.

During this official state visit, the president of the Slovak Republic is not accompanied by any responsible political representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, which also sent only its office head to China. Not just limited to Slovak diplomacy, representatives of other government departments, including the Ministry of Economy, did not use the opportunity to enhance contacts with the PRC. The offer of meetings in China and Kyrgyzstan [which Kovac is scheduled to visit on the way back home] was turned down also by the parliamentary clubs of the government parties, while the opposition did not let this opportunity slip.

Slovakia: President Kovac's Arrival in PRC Reported

LD1104200396 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 11 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Since Tuesday [9 April] our news bulletins have been keeping you informed about an official visit by Slovak President Michal Kovac to the PRC. Our colleague Vilma Bohunicka reports on his program in Beijing today:

[Bohunicka] The Slovak anthem and a 21-gun salute opened an official welcome ceremony at Tiananmen Square at 1600 local time [0800 GMT] in honor of Slovak President Michal Kovac. Accompanied by Chinese President Jiang Zemin, Michal Kovac inspected the honor guard. The two presidents and their entourages then left for the East Hall of the Chinese parliament to start official talks between the Slovak and Chinese delegations.

Michal Kovac opened his address by saying that Slovakia had been following China's successful economic development and saw China as a superpower whose importance constantly continues to grow. He went on to say that Slovakia depended on foreign markets and, therefore, viewed China as an interesting partner. He welcomed a Chinese initiative calling on Slovakia to participate in the development of some of the backward regions of China.

Slovak President Michal Kovac stressed that Slovakia respected the policy of one China and was not developing government contacts with Taiwan but, at the same time, was not ruling out a possibility of trade exchanges with Taiwan. Michal Kovac concluded his address by saying that the fundamental principle of Slovak foreign policy was European integration as well as a diversification of relations toward Asia. In this sphere, China is of priority importance for Slovakia.

The Chinese president said that Michal Kovac's visit would become a driving force in a further development of Slovak-Chinese relations, adding: We are glad to have an opportunity to welcome you as our personal guest in this country. He went on to say that cooperation between Slovakia and China on the international scene was good. China respected the policy of the Slovak Republic and its stance on Taiwan. He praised the fact that the president's entourage included businessmen, as there were untapped opportunities in Slovak-Chinese trade. [passage omitted]

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Hungary: SZDSZ Official Views Coalition Issues, Economy

AU1104105996 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 10 Apr 96 pp 1, 9

[Interview with SZDSZ Executive Chairman Tamas Bauer by Attila Zsoldos; place and date not given: "Economic Need Is Also a Partner"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Zsoldos] The latest congress of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] has just ended. Why did the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] refrain from evaluating the events?

[Bauer] We do not usually comment on the internal life of other parties; nor did we comment on the national meeting of the Hungarian Democratic Forum. However, we welcomed the fact that the MSZP congress confirmed the government's economic policy line.

[Zsoldos] What is your personal opinion about the MSZP congress?

[Bauer] I would only add that, in my view, the MSZP has never been so self-confident since the formation of the present government. This is obviously due to the fact that the government's painful economic policy has brought its first results. The socialists who received the stabilization package with very mixed feelings one year ago can now see that there was sense in the restrictive measures and the accompanying loss of popularity. This is what basically characterized the mood at this congress.

[Zsoldos] Is the fact that nobody questioned the coalition also connected with this?

[Bauer] The government coalition has also become clearly more consolidated compared with the situation prevailing one year or even half a year ago. Not simply because we got used to each other with the passing of time, but because the joint achievements have brought the coalition parties closer to each other. [passage omitted]

[Zsoldos] For the time being, however, the voice of extremist forces is gaining strength and the popularity of the Smallholders' Party [FKGP] is increasing, too. If I were a representative of the governing party, this would not make me self-confident.

[Bauer] It is quite natural that for the losers in restructuring to be receptive to social demagogy. When the democratic parties wear themselves out in the governing process, some of the protest voters automatically turn toward the extreme right, which rejects parliamentary democracy. The level of such a danger depends on whether the democratic forces isolate the extreme right-wing parties, as is natural in Western Europe. From this viewpoint, I regard as important what happened after 14 March 1996. Jozsef Torgyan crossed the Rubicon that separates the political behavior of the democratic opposition from the extremist incitement that opposes the foundations of democracy. It is unfortunate that most right-wing parties treated this behavior merely as a matter of style. However, there was an opposition party, namely the Federation of Young Democrats, that condemned Torgyan's attitude in the way that a democratic party should act. [passage omitted]

[Zsoldos] Although the SZDSZ does not like to speak about differences these days, what is the main difference between the future image of the SZDSZ and that of the MSZP?

[Bauer] One of the main differences between the two parties is the perception of the state's economic role—namely, what should be privatized and how; the positions of many socialist politicians markedly differ from that of SZDSZ politicians on the role of the state in the real sphere. This difference of view was behind last summer's coalition crisis on the creation of an economic ministry and Sandor Nagy's role in the government. However, this coalition is made up of three members: In addition to the MSZP and the SZDSZ, there is also an economic need, and this economic need supported the position of SZDSZ officials and of the pragmatic socialists who think like us on the issue of privatization or economic stabilization. The other such difference in concepts is that, by including the trade unions, the MSZP and the Interest Coordination Council would set up a corporate body. The SZDSZ has always taken a stand in favor of the trade unions' free activity and in favor of social partnership, and the SZDSZ also regards the social pact as desirable, but the SZDSZ firmly opposes any public functions for the trade unions or de facto veto right for the Interest Coordination Council on economic policy as a whole or on major issues. This coalition did not emerge from identical views regarding Hungary's future; instead, we agreed on the tasks that need to be carried out over these four years. In this respect, the coalition has proven itself.

Hungary: National Alliance Chairman on Opposition Prospects

AU1104153296 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 11 Apr 96 p 4

[Interview with National Alliance Chairman Peter Balaton by Oszy-Toth; place and date not given: "Opening Toward MIEP and the Social Democrats"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Oszy-Toth] You resigned as deputy chairman of the Presidium of the Hungarian

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Democratic Forum [MDF] a few months ago because this body thought your activity in the National Alliance was incompatible with your position. Now you are the chairman of the National Alliance and, at the same time, you are a member of the MDF Presidium. Are these two positions compatible?

[Balaton] Since I am no longer in a leading position in the MDF Presidium, I do not regard my present position as incompatible. Besides, I hope that with the increase in the importance of opposition cooperation, such conclusions will become increasingly senseless.

[Oszy-Toth] Many people in Hungary were shocked at Jozsef Torgyan's [Smallholders Party chairman] speech on 14 March, and the parliamentary parties also condemned his behavior. After all this, as an MDF politician, can you accept the leadership of the National Alliance of which the Smallholders Party [FKGP] is also a member?

[Balaton] There are no major differences in the political goals of the opposition parties; at most, there are differences in their styles: The Torgyan-style only befits Jozsef Torgyan and nobody else should imitate this.

[Oszy-Toth] Jozsef Torgyan could considerably harm the chances of cooperation among opposition parties....

[Balaton] If the opposition parties fail to coordinate their goals and programs in the future and, instead, they seek the possibilities of cooperation on the basis of individual empathy, they will have to face serious problems—irrespective of Zozsef Torgyan's 14 March speech. Besides, I do not think that a multicolored style would harm cooperation. Party leaders must fulfill the will of their voters and it is increasingly clear that the supporters of opposition parties agree with the programs of opposition parties and with the need to cooperate.

[Oszy-Toth] There was a debate in the MDF earlier on whether to set up a tripartite or four-party opposition alliance. What is your opinion on this?

[Balaton] If the modification of the electoral law makes it possible to obtain mandates proportionally, one can only form a governing force by making the opposition cooperation as complete as possible.

[Oszy-Toth] Whom do you have in mind?

[Balaton] In addition to the parliamentary parties, the Hungarian Justice and Life Party [MIEP] led by Istvan Csurka and a real social-democratic party.

[Oszy-Toth] At present, the social democratic party (parties) is (are) not a considerable political force....

[Balaton] I have information that a process of unification has begun in the social democratic parties in Hungary. Many people voted in favor of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] in 1994 because they did not have any other alternative: There was no real social democratic party on the political scene.

[Oszy-Toth] However, the socialists claim that they want to become real social democrats.

[Balaton] It is a mistake to believe that, after the 1994 elections, the right-wing government was replaced by a leftist government, one that, according to its own order of values, wants national progress. The real faultline lies between those who want the best for the nation and former internationalists disguised in the robes of "dissimilarity." So, leftist and right-wing orientations have lost their meaning in today's Hungarian domestic policy. The MSZP "spread over" from the classic left to the classic right on the political palette; it covers the entire society, from leftist workers' bodies to multibillionair entrepreneurs. The heads of the large trade union organizations are MSZP members, and they also control social security, the National Pension Fund, and the National Health Insurance Fund. A pact emerged within one party, instead of national consensus: the party state has been revived. The only difference is that this state is now based on wild capitalist and multinationalist pillars, instead of the previous socialist and internationalist pillars.

[Oszy-Toth] As National Alliance chairman, what can you do for the benefit of opposition cooperation?

[Balaton] So far, we have negotiated with the Christian Democratic People's Party and the FKGP, but we would also like to contact the MDF and the Federation of Young Democrats, as well as the parties outsides Parliament, like the MIEP and the social democrats. In the future, we want to organize national roundtable conferences, first for economists, and then for health-care professionals and educators. We want to win over professionals who would not like to be party politicians but would like to play a role in shaping the fate this country.

Hungary: Unemployment Situation Said Slowly Stabilizing

AU1104141696 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 11 Apr 96 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Labor Affairs Minister Peter Kiss by Andras Haeffler; place and date not given: "Work Can Begin in Crisis Zones"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Haeffler] How is the elimination of unemployment advancing?

[Kiss] In my opinion, the situation is slowly stabilizing. We have about 500,000 registered unemployed today;

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measured in European terms, this figure of 11 percent is not high. The unemployment level is much higher than this in several Western European countries. The problem here is that, within this 11 percent, there is a big proportion of lastingly unemployed people and people at the beginning of their career. In the middle of the summer, we would like to start a new employment system for the people at the beginning of their career; according to estimates, we will be able to provide jobs for about 80,000-100,000 young people. This will be a considerable measure because, at present, we have some 60,000 recently graduated unemployed on record. We count on a 3-to-4-percent economic growth in the second half of 1996, and this will improve the situation of lastingly unemployed people.

[Haeffler] One repeatedly hears both in the previous legislative cycle and in the present one that the actual number of unemployed is much larger than the number of registered unemployed.

[Kiss] There are partly more unemployed and partly less. The Central Statistical Office applies the methods of the ILO, and they show fewer unemployed than the number appearing in our records. The fact that many people do not even want to work and they only need unemployment benefits also increases the unemployment rate. Actually, there are also people who are no longer on our records and, unable to find a job, they do not even register with the labor exchange offices.

[Haeffler] Where does the limit of social tolerance lie?

[Kiss] Naturally, full employment would be desirable for individual people. Irrespective of the actual rate of unemployment, the one affected by this finds this status unbearable. The 5-to-5.5-percent unemployment in Budapest would be the desirable rate on a social scale. Every country lives through the changes according to its own situation: When unemployment grew from 2.5 percent to 4 percent in Switzerland, a dramatic mood emerged in the population and people expected an uncertainty that has never been felt there. In other European countries, people are calm with an unemployment rate of 8-10 percent because this rate can still be handled. According to experts, an unemployment rate above 14 percent is the limit of social tolerance. I hope that we will reach a rate of 10 percent in the second half of this year and we will see a further slow decrease in unemployment along with economic growth.

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B-H: IFOR 'Content' With Progress of Securing Heavy Weapons

AU1204112096 Paris AFP in English 1110 GMT 12 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, April 12 (AFP)—The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia is "content" that the former warring parties are locking up and accounting for heavy weapons ahead of a Thursday deadline, an IFOR spokesman said.

Under the Dayton peace treaty, IFOR's former warring parties have to lock up their heavy weapons in designated "cantonment sites" around the country by April 18 or face seizure of the weapons.

"Generally, we are content with the way things are going. They seem to be approaching it seriously. Last week it was a little bit uncoordinated," IFOR spokesman Major Simon Haselock said Friday.

On Tuesday in Pale, a Serb village outside Sarajevo, IFOR chief of operations British Brigadier Andrew Cumming warned that all the former warring factions were in "non-compliance" over their heavy weapons.

They were were providing false figures on the number of weapons they had around the country, he said.

IFOR was particularly concerned about the presence of hundreds of air defence systems, including surface-to-air missile systems and triple A anti-aircraft artillery, "loose" in the country, the officer added.

The public warning "appears to have worked," Haselock said Friday.

However weapons were still being found that were unreported by any of the parties, the spokesman added.

An IFOR patrol near Vares, north of Sarajevo had Thursday discovered an "undeclared heavy weapons site" operated by the mainly-Moslem Bosnian government army containing three tanks and an air defence artillery system.

Local Bosnian commanders were to be informed Friday the weapons must be removed to an authorised site, Haselock said.

"We will wait to the deadline to see" where all the parties are on compliance, he added.

B-H: Muratovic Says Islamic States Pledging 'Generous' Aid

AU1004160796 Paris AFP in English 1521 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, April 10 (AFP)—Ministers from 17 Islamic countries failed Wednesday [10 April] to announce an anticipated joint aid package for Bosnia with only two making firm pledges at a donor conference at the weekend.

Iran promised to pay $50 million in aid to Bosnia and Turkey promised $80 million in aggregate aid and credits, Bosnian Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic said.

Ministers from 15 other Islamic countries, who are expected to attend the Brussels donor conference Friday and Saturday, "promised generous contributions," the Bosnian premier said.

The enlarged contact group of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) met in Sarajevo on Wednesday to agree a common position on aid to war-ravaged Bosnia two days before the crucial donor conference in Brussels.

The World Bank, which is co-hosting the Brussels conference with the European Union, has appealed to donors worldwide to pledge $1.2 billion in aid to Bosnia at the conference.

Muratovic said he had made a "very clear request to the Islamic countries to pay one-third" of the money required for Bosnia's post-war reconstruction—or $400 million this year.

B-H: Iran's FM: Reconstruction Yet To Be Seriously Addressed

LD1004182296 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian 1630 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The meeting of the Islamic Contact Group's foreign ministers ended a few hours ago in the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo with the release of a statement. Here is our colleague with a report from Sarajevo.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] At the meeting of the foreign ministers and representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Guinea, Turkey, Pakistan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and several other Islamic countries, Iran's Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati, in the inaugural speech to the session, described Iran's stances regarding the ways of realizing a fair and lasting peace in Bosnia and the role played by the Organization of Islamic Conference in that regard.

In the final resolution of the meeting, the Islamic foreign ministers reiterated the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina within recognized international borders. In that regard, they expressed their support for the resolution on Bosnian territorial integrity which was signed by Bosnian personalities and parties on 3 April 1996.

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Another part of the resolution states: The meeting declares its readiness for the purpose of offering military aid to the Bosnian Republic government, in order to strengthen the defensive capabilities of that country's army, including training and equipping it, aimed at establishing a military balance and securing a deterrence in the face of any likely aggression.

The participants stressed their continued support for the Bosnian people and government, bilaterally and through the aid mobilization group from the OIC, for reconstruction, and declared their readiness to offer immediate and sufficient resources for relief aid, economic needs, and the assistance of needy people, as well as job creation for troops.

In a statement before the end of the meeting, Mr. Velayati referred to the point that the humanitarian section of the peace agreement, including reconstruction plans, is yet to be addressed seriously. He said that he considers reconstruction to be a precondition for the role of the other parts of the agreement and said: That is a goal which all of us pursue.

This evening the Islamic Republic of Iran's headquarters for reconstruction and cultural center in Sarajevo was inaugurated in the presence of Mr. Velayati, Bosnian Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic, Minister of Education Rizvanbegovic, and a large group of Bosnian businessmen and artists. [end recording]

B-H: Iran's Velayati Speaks at Sarajevo OIC Conference

LD1004224896 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2035 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Summary] During a report on today's OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference) aid conference in Sarajevo, Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine carries the following recording of Iranian Foreign Minister Ali-Akbar Velayati's speech; Velayati speaks in English, with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation:

"Being in Sarajevo has provided an opportunity for our Foreign Ministry to see the extent of destruction brought upon Muslim brothers here in Bosnia. Our presence here once again confirms our commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"I would like to take this opportunity to raise the following points: The OIC Contact Group, as representative of the Islamic countries, has faithfully supported the Bosnian people and Government throughout the war, and I believe that now that the war has come to an end, the OIC should preserve and strengthen the same dedication and commitment to the implementation of peace and reconstruction.

"Since the achievement of a just and durable peace in the region is an important factor for the maintenance of international peace and security, we are of the view that the OIC Contact Group and the five-nation Contact Group should coordinate their activities in order to fulfill these tasks more effectively.

"Finally, let me point out that the declaration prepared by senior officials is an excellent expression of our common views. I think that its circulation as an official document of the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council will bring our clearly elaborated positions at this critical moment to the attention of the international community."

B-H: Iran, Bosnia Sign Political, Economic, Cultural Accord

LD1004184096 Tehran IRIB Television First Program Network in Persian 1630 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Islamic Republic of Iran and Bosnia-Herzegovina are to expand their political, economic, and cultural cooperation. According to a memorandum of understanding signed by the foreign ministers of the two countries, Iran will participate in Bosnia's reconstruction. For that purpose, a headquarters for the reconstruction of Bosnia has been inaugurated in Sarajevo.

The two sides have also agreed on establishing cultural attache sections in Tehran and Sarajevo, and consular facilities for the two countries' nationals.

The continuation of close cooperation by the two countries in the economic sphere is another of the issues contained in the Iran-Bosnia-Herzegovina memorandum of understanding.

B-H: Turkey's Aykut Comments on Aid at OIC Meeting

TA1104090696 Ankara TRT Television Network in Turkish 1700 GMT 10 Apr 96

[Ahmet Yesiltepe video report from Sarajevo]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Addressing the Organization of the Islamic Conference [OIC] Bosnia-Herzegovina contact group meeting in Sarajevo today, State Minister Imren Aykut declared that the Islamic countries were on the side of Bosnia-Herzegovina in its darkest days, and pledged that this support will continue in every field. Recalling that international military measures are only temporary, Aykut noted that a balance must be achieved between the

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Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and the Serbian Army of Bosnia, as stipulated in the Dayton agreement. [passage omitted]

[Begin Aykut recording] Bosnia-Herzegovina urgently needs $1.8 billion this year alone. It has become clear that only $400 million of this amount has so far been secured. The remaining portion must be added as soon as possible, because the people are destitute. I could not have imagined the horrible images I encountered when I came here. I saw the children, the many orphans, the large numbers of maimed persons, the lonely women. There is no production in the country. I held bilateral contacts with representatives of the countries participating in the meeting concerning the disabled children and single mothers, and I received certain promises for help. [end recording]

The real results of the OIC ministerial meeting will become clear in Brussels on 12-13 April.

B-H: Malaysian Minister Stresses Assistance in Reconstruction

BK1104070196 Kuala Lumpur WATAN in Malay 11 Apr 96 p 2

[BERNAMA report]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, Wednesday [10 April]—Malaysia has reiterated its commitment to assisting in the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina by offering to cooperate with the Balkan state in the technical, commercial, and economic fields.

Defense Minister Datuk Syed Hamid Albar said today that Malaysia will encourage its investors to take advantage of Bosnia's potential to ensure the progress, peace, and stability of the Balkan state as called for under the Dayton peace agreement.

Speaking to BERNAMA today, he said: "The government will encourage the private sector to redevelop Bosnia. Prime Minister Datuk Sri Dr. Mahathir Mohamed will initiate this effort by bringing several business leaders along during his visit next week."

The minister is here to attend the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) meeting to discuss the issue of a joint stand on the redevelopment of Bosnia.

Foreign and defense ministers from Bangladesh, Bahrain, Brunei, Egypt, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Malaysia, Pakistan, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates are attending the two-day meeting.

B-H: OIC Ends Sarajevo Conference, Issues Declaration

AU1004185296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 10 Apr 96

[Report by Zenaida Adilovic]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following the conclusion of today's ministerial meeting of the expanded contact group for Bosnia-Herzegovina of the Organization of Islamic Conference [OIC], a news conference was held. The conference was opened by Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Jadranko Prlic.

According to Minister Prlic, the participants in the conference unanimously adopted a declaration of friendship and partnership. The declaration contains 19 points. Here are some of them:

Full support to the implementation of the Dayton agreement; the establishment of a democratic, multiethnic, and multicultural Bosnia-Herzegovina; the importance of the mission of High Representative Carl Bildt in the impartial implementation of the civilian aspects of the Dayton agreement; and military support to the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially with regard to establishing the federal army to attain military balance in the region.

Guinean Foreign Minister (Kozo Zoumanigvi), chairman of the ministerial conference, addressed the correspondents with the following words:

[Begin (Zoumanigvi) recording in French with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] Our presence in Sarajevo confirms once again our support to Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is certainly a political part of the support by Islamic countries prior to the donor conference that will be held in Brussels.

At the meeting, we discussed what we have done for Bosnia-Herzegovina and what we can do in the future. Islamic countries will continue to provide aid for the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina. [end recording]

OIC Secretary General Hamid al-Gabid expressed his gratitude to the Government and the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina for the warm welcome.

[Begin al-Gabid recording in French with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] I think that the meeting has accomplished its aim. In other words, it has brought differing views in line prior to the meeting in Brussels. We hope that the promises that are going to be made in Brussels will suit the needs of this country. [end recording]

In his speech, Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic said:

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[Begin Muratovic recording] Regarding the political part, all Islamic countries have once again expressed the same views and agreed on all parts of the declaration that was issued at the end of the meeting. They have extended support to a sovereign, unified Bosnia-Herzegovina, within its historical border, a democratic state, a multinational, a multicultural, a multiethnic, a multireligious country. They demand that all the members provide economic and political support to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to appear at the Brussels conference with the generosity that they have been demonstrating up to now.

High Representative Carl Bildt has been asked to find a way for us to receive compensation for the damage in the Sarajevo suburbs that was made during the most recent destruction by the extreme Serb elements.

Regarding the countries that want to make donations only to the Federation, of whom there are indeed very few, we said they should make their contributions on their own, through bilateral contacts with us, or to give them directly to some institutions. As far as we are concerned, we take the view that after the elections all contributions should be used for the integral projects of development of the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina. [end recording]

OIC Secretary General Hamid al-Gabid handed a $3-million check to Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as the organization's aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The check was given to the governor of the National Bank of Bosnia-Herzegovina to be deposited.

B-H: FM Prlic Meets French Counterpart in Paris

LD1104215296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 11 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Jadranko Prlic, foreign minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who is paying a one-day visit to Paris, today met Herve de Charette, foreign minister of the French Republic.

The two ministers exchanged views on the course of the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, which had been initialled in Dayton and fully and officially signed in Paris.

A high degree of agreement on various issues has been achieved, as well as on the principles and kinds of future operations of the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the whole region.

The talks centered in particular on the elections that should be held by mid-September on the whole territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the freedom of the media, and the functioning of state authorities in two entities.

Minister Prlic pointed out France's important role during the four-year mission of the peace forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where nearly 60 French soldiers had been killed.

Asserting France's readiness to actively participate in the future activities of the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Minister de Charette pointed out the resolve of the international community and other international players to offer financial and other support to projects and forces that are in favor of Bosnia-Herzegovina's reintegration.

B-H: Commentary on Izetbegovic-Silajdzic 'Power Struggle'

AU1104151396 Sarajevo SVIJET in Serbo-Croatian 11 Apr 96 p 9

[Commentary by Gojko Beric: "Renewed Alliance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] From the standpoint of political responsibility for the destiny of the country, it would be natural if there were the sign of equality between the Declaration on the Integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina on one hand, and the unexpected similarity of Alija Izetbegovic's and Haris Silajdzic's views on the other. However, more serious analyses of this most recent turn on the Bosnian political stage indicate that one should be careful about it. The majority of analysts are more interested in the personal background to this turn, which, to a certain degree, leaves the essence of the subject in the shadow.

Izetbegovic and Silajdzic split two months ago in a way that was not at all tender. Even the usual quantity of courteous sentimentality was missing. At the moment that the prime minister resigned, and also refused to obey in any other sense, Izetbegovic didn't hesitate to mark him as the main brakeman of the Bosniak-Croat federation. Tudjman's media immediately used the offered opportunity to "find" the long-sought scapegoat in the personality of Silajdzic, who, until then, enjoyed certain concessions. Silajdzic returned the fire by shooting from all positions possible. In a series of interviews, he accused Izetbegovic of being the sponsor of the totalitarization of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] and of abusing religion for political purposes. He has compared the behavior of his former party to the behavior of the former communist party. In the end, he formed his own party—the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina. As its basic objectives, he has presented the maintenance of a united Bosnia-Herzegovina, the reorganization of the state, the elimination of the army, the police, and religious institutions from politics, and the introduction of the rule of law.

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Although, according to a further personal confession, he had split with the ruling party two years ago, Silajdzic remained faithful to President Izetbegovic until the end of the war. For a long time, he managed to absorb the shock of some Izetbegovic's statements and moves that the West did not like very much. Despite that, it was not always easy to determine what the differences between the two of them were. Izetbegovic has not always been consistent on the issues of the united Bosnia-Herzegovina, the relation between religion and the state, the return of refugees, or priorities in foreign policy. His deeds have not always been in line with his declared stands. Sometimes, one got the impression that he would agree with the creation of a little Muslim state, if that only meant the end of the Bosniak tragedy. Unlike Izetbegovic, Silajdzic, even at the worst times for Bosnia and the Bosniaks, never gave up the idea of a united and multiethnic state.

Their renewed similarity of views has become the subject of great interest. Everybody wonders what stands behind it. There is no doubt that this similarity is forced. The only question is whether it is the result of mutual analyses of the situation in Bosnia, or, as many people think, there is new pressure from the United States. For a long time, Washington has not been inclined toward Izetbegovic, to whom the U.S. media, using a well-tested stereotype, imputes the aspiration to install Islamic fundamentalism in Bosnia, which he has denied on many occasions. The elections in Bosnia are drawing near, and the United States, allegedly, wants to promote Silajdzic in the fall as the Bosniak leader instead of Izetbegovic.

It can sound pretty convincing, particularly if one bears in mind the spreading claim that NATO will stay in Bosnia for a long, long time. However, that does not offer an answer to the question of whether the United States is motivated by its rejection of the creation of a small Islamic state or by its resolve to preserve a united and multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina. If the latter is the case, than this resolve should be directed toward an urgent implementation of all the provisions of the Dayton accord, in which case the alliance between Izetbegovic and Silajdzic is not of prime importance.

Putting this in the context of the power struggle also has its advocates. In their opinion, the split between Izetbegovic and Silajdzic was only a maneuver by which small political differences were elevated to the level of irreconcilable options. For the time being, however, there are no arguments that could prove that thesis, unless one sees in it the stance of some parties that were neither explicitly against the declaration nor particularly in favor of signing it.

Although the declaration on the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina does not really contain any new ideas, it represents an organized political resistance to the destruction of Bosnia. On the other hand, it opens the door to a new political culture in Sarajevo. Namely, the split between political opposed persons is no reason for a quake in the whole state, just like the creation of a new alliance, or a reconstruction of an old alliance, does not necessarily have to be a matter for suspicion or speculation.

B-H: Izetbegovic's TV Interview, Opinion Poll Viewed

AU1104130296 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 11 Apr 96 p 2

[Commentary by N. Basic: "Izetbegovic's Preelection Messages"]

[FBIS Translated Text] President Alija Izetbegovic's latest television appearance can definitely be said to have been part of his election campaign. It seems that, this time, President Izetbegovic felt that two messages were important: To make soldiers happy by announcing the distribution of savings booklets to them and to explain to the people how deleterious for the unity of the Bosniak national body the appearance of Silajdzic's new party is.

This TV interview can be viewed in the context of the upcoming elections. It is not unimportant who informs the soldiers, who are facing an insecure social future, that they will get something, that somebody cares about them. It is a body of 200,000 potential voters on which the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] is counting.

Silajdzic is a somewhat more complicated story, though. His departure from the SDA and his establishment of a new party, whose convention is expected to take place soon, is causing concern in the ruling SDA. In Sarajevo, a question is being asked: Does Izetbegovic's appearance on television have anything to do with the public opinion poll, the results of which were published in the 4 April issue of DANI magazine?

This magazine polled more than 5,000 citizens in Sarajevo, Zenica, Tuzla, Mostar, and Gorazde. The results show a decline in the SDA's popularity. According to the results, 37 percent of the citizens would vote for Silajdzic's party, and 4 percent fewer citizens would vote for the SDA. Likewise, Silajdzic is shown as convincingly the most popular politician, receiving 41 percent of the votes, while Izetbegovic is rated second, with 26 percent.

Izetbegovic is convinced that, had the break with the former prime minister not occurred, the SDA would

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have been the absolute winner in the elections. Now, however, the situation has changed completely, and therefore the SDA leader is warning that Silajdzic will disrupt the unity of the Bosniak national body. This is the point of the whole story. Therefore, President Izetbegovic is warning that the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats will remain unified, while the Bosniaks will remain divided.

President Izetbegovic reveals what he said to Silajdzic: "If the idea of Bosnia can be forced on the other side, I will be the first to vote for his party." Another important detail from his interview: The signing of the Declaration on a Unified Bosnia does not mean a step toward a coalition between the SDA and Silajdzic's party.

It can be expected that a campaign will follow in which the danger of division within the Bosnian national body will be a major issue. Silajdzic has already answered in an interview for FOCUS magazine: "Those who say that the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina endangers the unity of the Bosniak people underestimate that people."

B-H: Zubak Addresses Federation Assembly

AU1104192896

[FBIS Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 0909 GMT on 11 April carries a live relay of the 13th session of the Federation Assembly discussing, among other things, the progress made in implementing the Dayton accords and accompanying documents pertaining to the implementation of the Federation. The opening speaker on this topic is Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who addresses the deputies at 1010 GMT.

Zubak begins his speech by describing the current state of affairs in the Federation. He says that "the process of establishing the Federation is entering its most critical stage, the stage of practical implementation and the establishing of the system in the most sensitive areas of the Federation, and in the increasingly important sections and points of the state system, which are the army, finance, the police, and the symbols of the Federation. (?This) practical implementation of the Federation Constitution and other agreements necessary for its implementation have once again brought to the surface all our differences in views on the system that [words indistinct] and the overall relations in the Federation.

"For these reasons—in other words, because of our different views—we need help and arbitration of the international community. We needed the agreements that were reached in Rome, Geneva, and the most recent one in Sarajevo on 30 March. They have been revealed to the public in full, thoroughly analyzed, and I think there is no need for me to talk about them again, to cite, to explain, or to analyze them.

"I would like to say in connection with them that those who are asking why we need so many [words indistinct] only appear to be right. It is certain that, owing to the inflation of agreements on the Federation, we, as their creators and signatories, are losing our credibility, as Mr. Konjicija said. We would quickly put a stop to this practice, and could have done so a long time ago had we been able to build the system without these agreements. We know very well that all these agreements—the Dayton agreement on breathing life into the Federation, and all the last three agreements—represent only the reinterpretation and the [word indistinct] of the agreement that we signed in Petersburg near Bonn on 9 March (?1995). These agreements talk in fact about the (?our) differences and are needed to remove these differences in order to reduce the maneuvering space for different interpretations, understanding, and the implementation of these agreements.

"We, who are working on this difficult, thankless, and complicated job, also needed them because of the political atmosphere in which we [words indistinct], which you also know very well.

"After all, the best illustration of the situation is the state of relations after the signing of the Sarajevo agreement. The signatures on that document were not even dry and almost every one of its points was disputed in the public by relevant people, in the political sense of the word. Or, the latest example involving the decision of the federal minister of finances concerning the payment of custom duties. The parliament adopted exactly one year ago a law on customs that customs duties be paid in German marks. Now that we have started with the unified customs, now that the first payments of custom duties [words indistinct], there are some individuals [words indistinct], who, by using the media, are destroying what we have agreed on and transformed into a norm."

Continuing his comments on the differences between the federal partners, Zubak says that the interpretation of the "laws on the division of authority between the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bosnia-Herzegovina and relations between these two systems" has caused numerous "ambiguities." He says that "for the aforementioned reasons, we need the arbitration of the international community. All these agreements on contentious topics and issues [words indistinct] require a written form, a form of a (?verified) document. Therefore, I think that is superfluous to hold discussions and ask whether we need so many and agreements and accords. We do."

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Zubak then goes on to talk about the results that have been achieved despite the disagreements. He says that "we know what the territory of the Federation is, what its powers are," adding that "significant progress has been made in a short period of time," "much more than in the previous period." Zubak says that "we have opened the roads, lifted blockades in different regions, restored infrastructure, and went from the state of hostility—this should be said openly—to the state of alliance. We, the Croat Defense Council and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, have worked in a coordinated, offensive, and [words indistinct] fashion, which has resulted in significant [words indistinct] and represented the basis for concluding the peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina and the best stimulus to restore trust between us. These are the results of that period."

Zubak then goes on to praise the government for its intensive work and for holding "15 sessions" in full complement, "the result of which were some 15 draft laws, over 20 [word indistinct] acts, mainly in the sphere of finances, administration, and legislature. The government has adopted rules of procedure on the internal organization of ministries and thus created the preconditions for the federal ministries to be filled in accordance with the agreement to bring the Federation to life." He says the greatest progress "has been made in the sphere of finances." He adds that the "government and some ministries have started to function, and its decisions have started to be implemented on the whole of the Federation's territory." According to him, the efforts have recently been made to set in motion the cantonal authorities in the "most sensitive areas, central Bosnia, and central Herzegovina—that is, Cantons 6 and 7, central Bosnia and the Neretva Valley."

Zubak then goes on to say that "generally speaking, the process of introducing the federal system of authority has started moving faster. This will created the conditions for the faster transfer of authority from the existing administrative arrangements to the federal institutions. This will remove the existing legal and institutional dualism that still exists on the territory of the Federation." Zubak adds that "the emphasis is on developing the structure of authority, although many other issues are also of prime importance, especially the issue of the return of the refugees and displaced persons, social protection, [words indistinct], reconstruction, and development."

Reiterating everyone's responsibility for the development of the Federation "project," Zubak says it is important to create a "different, healthier political climate," and that the media should spend more time praising and "affirming" the results achieved so far rather than criticize and devalue them.

According to Zubak, "following all this, an objective, neutral observer from outside can draw only one conclusion—namely, that there can be no coexistence in this region, and that setting up the Federation is unrealistic, and the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina (?impossible). This is not correct. We must do everything to change such [word indistinct]. Instead of that practice, the practice of denying one's own responsibility and shifting it onto others, and in this context the irresponsible [word indistinct] political campaign, irresponsible manipulations in the media, and in order to make positive shifts in setting up [words indistinct] development of a unified federal system of authority and solve all the problems of [words indistinct], we need to do everything to support and help process the Federation's development, which means the removal of those who are resisting it. This can only be done in the conditions of stable political circumstances and interrelations. This means that important decisions must be made on the principle of (?harmonizing views)."

Zubak says that "without the Federation, there is no Dayton agreement, and therefore setting the Federation into motion is an important condition for the realization of the peace agreement as a whole. The realization of the peace agreement, as you already know, [words indistinct] information given in the republican assembly yesterday, and the relevant international institutions, is moving relatively well. The military part is proceeding very well, while some aspects of the civilian part are slow in realization and are experiencing numerous difficulties.

"For its part, the Federation has done everything that is needed for [word indistinct] to be realized in both the military and civilian parts. All problems and the responsibility for the problems in its implementation mainly lie in the Republika Srpska [Serb Republic]. However, to be objective, I must say that our side has not always been sufficiently consistent and sufficiently cooperative. There were some objections regarding the removal of checkpoints, the withdrawal of some [word indistinct] weapons, and the problems in the [words indistinct]."

Concluding his speech, Zubak stresses the importance of speeding up the process of setting up the Federation and reconstruction. He says that "in this difficult and tragic war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there are no military victors. This is generally known and is a general view. But, in the finale, the victor will be the one who normalizes life first, who restores the economy, and (?enters) the European and world integrational processes, which should be our aim. This is what I think. We can accomplish this only with material help from abroad."

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B-H: Ganic Suggests Permanent Assembly Session

AU1104195196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 11 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] We now have our correspondent at the Federal Assembly, Mladen Bosnjak, on the line:

[Bosnjak] Good evening from the hall where the 13th session of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina's Constituent Assembly is being held. Following the recess, which lasted until shortly before 1900, Ejup Ganic, Drago Bilandzija, and Kasim Begic addressed the assembly. Ivan Sarac is currently speaking.

In his speech, Federation Vice President Ganic pointed out that federal problems make up 90 percent of the problems of the Bosnia-Herzegovina state and that everything else depends on their solution. As a solution, he suggested a permanent session of the Constituent Assembly and said that it is necessary because of the coordination of the Dayton agreement and the federal constitution. According to him, parliament cannot leave that obligation to someone else.

Rade Bilandzija, federal deputy prime minister and finance minister, who has lately been criticized, particularly in the press and at today's Constituent Assembly session, took the floor in order to explain how and why it has come to some decisions from the sphere of federal customs because of which he was criticized. He recalled everything that was done in cooperation with the IMF and the World Bank in the previous period. He pointed out that the task set up in Dayton was to introduce federal customs by 1 April and that, in accordance with the law on customs of the Federation, it is necessary to charge customs and other duties in German marks.

After Mr. Bilandzija, Kasim Begic took the floor and claimed that, according to the Dayton agreement, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina regulates its customs system and complete financial system and that the problem in this case is simply whether the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is more senior than the Federation. Mr. Bilandzija then went on to say that for him, as federal minister, the Federal system is [word indistinct] and that he will implement it and that, in order to solve all these problems, it is necessary to coordinate the constitutions and thereby prevent any possible misunderstandings. Ivan Sarac, deputy of the Croat people and member of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], among other things, assessed that [word indistinct] is not necessary and that in order to realize Mr. Ganic's proposal, it is first necessary to define what a permanent session is and what is meant by it.

Speaking at the moment is Mr. Stjepan Jurkic. We will report on what he said and more of the Constituent Assembly session in our later newscast and in the live relay if it is held.

B-H: Pasalic: If We Follow Dayton, Federation Will Live

AU1104103796 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 6-8 Apr 96 p 3

[Interview with Dr. Ivic Pasalic, presidential adviser, by Vedran Matosic; place and date not given: "The Federation Has Gotten Over Its Growing Pains"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

Real Progress—Establishment of Cantons

[Passage omitted] [Matosic] "The Forum for the Federation" has recently been founded in Sarajevo. Does anyone know what this organization will concretely be doing?

[Pasalic] I must admit that I know only what I have read in the agency news, that is, it is a forum whose basic objective will be to observe and to implement the agreement on the Federation. According to the information available so far, that falls within the framework of various protocols already adopted, as a form of additional pressure upon the people responsible for the implementation of everything agreed and signed.

[Matosic] In your opinion, what will happen with the Serb entity? If we look at it at the constitutional and legal level, does it not seem logical to have that entity represented in the representative bodies in Sarajevo, of course, without the criminal leadership?

[Pasalic] The Dayton agreement very clearly defines that Bosnia-Herzegovina consist of two entities, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and RSK [as published—the Republic of Serb Krajina; the Bosnian Serb Republic is meant]. One cannot go beyond those limits, unless one wants to call the agreement into question. I think that is the only solution for the implementation of the Federation and normalization in general. The consistent implementation of [the] Washington [treaty] and [the] Dayton [agreement], without any kind of correction, is the only way possible, because, otherwise, all those who are responsible would have an alibi for abandoning the solutions of those basic acts. It would be very dangerous to go beyond the Dayton limits, and it is absolutely certain that the most responsible factors, primarily the United States, would not allow that. After all, they have said that very clearly.

Declaration Is an Awkward Document

[Matosic] The media have recently published that Silajdzic and Izetbegovic had drawn near to each other,

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resulting in the conclusion that the concept of a "civic" Bosnia is returning to life, that is, the aspiration to increasingly convert the whole area to Islam. Is it really the beginning of such a process?

[Pasalic] The signing of that declaration and in general the idea to go with such an approach, which is outside the usual political work at the level of institutions, is certainly a phenomenon that deserves our attention and can have various consequences. If one wants to implement the Federation and create circumstances for the return of refugees, and if one generally aspires to provide a lasting and stable peace, there is no doubt that one must not ignore the limits of formal and legal acts, nor the spirit of Washington and Dayton. After all, that was the only way that the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina could accept that package, because its essence is the equality of Croats in the Federation, and the constitutionality in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Anything that diverges from that represents the toppling of the Federation. It seems to me that this declaration is an awkward document, which, consciously or unconsciously, encourages those forces that are against the Federation.

It has proved that if one consistently implements the documents in the presence of international arbitrators, the Federation can make great strides forward. However, it is known that Mr. Silajdzic, after splitting with his party, spoke very sharply against the Federation. Naturally, that raises the question of the declaration in itself. It has not been signed by the representatives of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], but equally it has not been signed by the representatives of SDP [Social Democratic Party], HSS [Croatian Peasants Party], Republican Party, MBO [Muslim Bosniak Organization], that is, the oppositional parties of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I believe that this declaration will fall into oblivion, and that the implementation of the Federation will go fast, in line with what the leading people of the Federation have signed.

Mostar Proves Consistency of Croatian Politics

[Matosic] The Croatian side, too, has often been criticized for its relations toward the Federation and its implementation. What details would you particularly point out, and what do you think, in what way will Mostar develop under the new administrator?

[Pasalic] As far as the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina are concerned, it is clear that their individual interests differ, depending upon whether they live in central Bosnia, western Herzegovina, or in some other parts of the Federation. Since the whole situation is very complicated, and it has been extremely difficult to reach a solution for a lasting peace, those differences are more logical and more understandable. However, after the signing in Washington and Dayton, there were different statements about the acceptance and nonacceptance of those agreements, particularly on the part of the Croatian corps that was actually struck the most, the Croats of Bosnian Posavina [the Sava river basin].

However, it has also in a petty political way been used by the whole opposition and various nonparliamentary political structures, through which, in fact, the signing of the Dayton agreement has been unanimously condemned, while today, shamelessly, their mouths are full of Dayton and the implementation of the peace agreements. So, time is a factor that does its job, and the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina have accepted not only the Federation, but also its tight association with the Republic of Croatia as the best way of preserving survival in that region, and there is no longer any significant resistance there. That model has been accepted by the majority of people and the whole leadership of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The example of Mostar also proves the consistency of Croatian politics. After an illogical and partial decision, it has been proved there that the Croats are reasonable enough to point out something that is untenable, and something that does not contribute to peace in the Federation. It is hard to tell whether Mr. Koschnick is leaving for that reason or not. He certainly wanted to do his job honestly, but everyone has his limits, and so has he.

B-H: Delic Denies Foreigners Present in Army

AU110412 [illegible]96 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 1 Apr 96 p 5

[Interview with Army General Rasim Delic, commander of the General Staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, by Senad Mesetovic; place and date not given: "Through 'Partnership' Into the NATO Alliance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Dayton peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina anticipates many changes and transformations for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. Also, the acute issues these days are the questions of the lifting of the arms embargo for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, the distribution of security papers for the soldiers of our army, and so on. These and other acute questions were the topics of our interview with Commander of the General Staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, Army General Rasim Delic.

[Mesetovic] How is the process of demobilization going?

[Delic] At this moment the demobilization is not advancing with the anticipated speed. We have problems

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in solving the social and status matters of the demobilized soldiers. Therefore, we wish to create space which would enable us to secure their social status, and then speed up the process. In fact, according to the Dayton agreement, the dynamics of the demobilization will be particularly intensive from 1 April to 1 June, when we should demobilize the majority of soldiers, and leave only the part which will remain in the military profession.

[Mesetovic] Will the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army fulfill the deadline of 19 April, when all units should be in their barracks?

[Delic] The Army has taken the necessary measures to meet that deadline. We may have some technical problems concerning IFOR [Implementation Force], because we have still not received the official approval from IFOR allowing us to use the facilities which we have planned to be our barracks, and the Dayton agreement anticipates that that should be approved by the IFOR commander.

It may happen that in a certain moment IFOR says that we cannot use some facilities, so we will have to look for fast solutions.

Empty the Whole City

[Mesetovic] How did the dispute between the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO [Croatian Defense Council], concerning the barracks in Butile and Blazuj, end?

[Delic] There was no dispute. The HVO tried to create a dispute, using the provisions of the Dayton agreement, which demanded the announcement of the troops distribution until D+120, so they forwarded a proposal that that should be in Blazuj and Butile. The HVO is not connected with these barracks through any physical connections. Having in mind what the HVO did to Sarajevo, which I told to the commander of IFOR as an argument, he decided to reject the request of the HVO. The Army [of Bosnia-Herzegovina] has already moved into the barracks in Butile, whereas the barracks in Blazuj is intended to be used as storage space, and the IFOR command decided that its purpose should remain that of storage space, which will be given to the future federal army.

[Mesetovic] How do you interpret the latest accusations of the Hague Tribunal, which refer to three Bosniaks?

[Delic] When it comes to the Hague Tribunal, it is possible to find individual cases in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army when somebody did something against humanity, human rights and dignity, but as an individual. I know for sure that in the system of command there have been no such cases. If these accusations are an intention to find a sort of balance again, I do not think that that is the right way. Because, I do not know how many criminals could be found on the Serb side which should be extradited to The Hague—the question is whether The Hague should be emptied as a city in order to be able to accommodate all those who have committed crimes against the Bosniak people on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Mesetovic] Has the import of small arms for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army started?

[Delic] With D+90, the arms embargo has been lifted, but import has still not started. We are now about to begin the process of armament and training, to be carried out by the United States as a patron over that process. We told the competent people in the U.S. Administration who are responsible for this that we had no time to wait. In case conditions for the creation of the federal army cannot be made, conditions must be made for the armament of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. We will work on that issue. In any case, we will not be late in arming ourselves. But, the essence of the lifting of the embargo is only after D+180, when the embargo on the import of heavy arms is lifted, and that is what the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army has lacked most.

With Pressure for the Federal Army

[Mesetovic] Have there been any advances in the "Train and Equip" program?

[Delic] I have already partially answered this question. That is a program which was thought out well, but it is obvious that some things have been badly evaluated, in the sense that no appropriate campaign has been organized in the donor countries, so that, for example, what happened was that the entire European Union denied the arming and the equipping of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army.

Second, the ground was rather poorly prepared for the donor conference in Ankara, where many expressed their readiness to support the program, but with more concrete data and indicators. If the condition for that is the federal army, then pressure should be exercised for its formation. It obviously is going very hard in the negotiations.

When it comes to the federal army, one should start from military principles, because in the process of negotiating there are things which have nothing to do with the army. They are not an expression of the policy of the Federation, but of a policy which has as its goal the destruction of the Federation.

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Mercenaries Have Always Existed

[Mesetovic] What about the "Dole amendment," which stipulates that no means for the armament of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army should be approved before foreigners leave Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Delic] During the talks I had in the United States, I told my interlocutors, and there were many of them, that they should no longer use the argument of foreigners in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, because they cannot prove that argument. The purpose of our pressure, that they should visit some units of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, which I approved of—for example, the 7th and 8th Muslim Brigade, or the Black Swans—is to show that in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army there are no foreigners [sentence as published].

As a matter of fact, we had no need for foreigners. We had a need for arms. The fact that in the course of this war there were a few hundred foreigners in our units is because no wars have been conducted in the world up to now with exclusively local population. There have always been some volunteers, even adventurers who, for various reasons, joined one or the other side.

Such "arguments" can have two purposes. One is that they do not want to arm the federal army and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, which should then be said publicly, and the other is that that is used as a means of political pressure on the state organs of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the process of the implementation of the Dayton agreement.

I believe that those are not real arguments, and that is my comment on the "Dole amendment." There is no evidence, and we have offered them a chance to prove what they have been claiming; nobody has actually tried to present all that in an argumented way.

[Mesetovic] Has IFOR examined the presence of foreign mercenaries on the Serb and the Croat side?

[Delic] I have had no such information, but I did warn about that during the meeting of the joint military commission. It is not only a question of foreign mercenaries, but of foreigners, and foreigners are all those who are not from Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the Serb army there are still soldiers from the territory of Croatia; a month ago there were 30,000 of them. Those are Serbs who fled from Croatia, and they are in military uniforms.

Keeping Friends

That also refers to Martic's police, who still wear the uniforms of the so-called Republic of Serbian Krajina. Meaning, those are real foreigners who are present. I have pointed that out, and IFOR's excuses are that they all speak the same language, that it is hard to notice differences, and so on.

It is similar when it comes to the HVO. I have been warning about Kulen Vakuf for a long time now. Allegedly there are still representatives of the HVO on the territory of Kulen Vakuf. However, physically they could only have come from the territory of Croatia; it is an area which in no case could have been liberated, or reached, by the HVO.

If we go further and take a look at the officer cadre in the Serb army, we will see that there are still officers who were born and who have their residences in Serbia. After all, all the officers in the Serb army are paid by Belgrade. So, there are a number of arguments which IFOR should check on the other side.

[Mesetovic] Will Bosnia-Herzegovina enter the "Partnership for Peace," and later the NATO alliance?

[Delic] That is a matter of political orientation, because the policy conducted by the state organs of Bosnia-Herzegovina expresses a wish to be there where we geographically are—in Europe, and all those things which influence security in Europe should not pass us by. In this case it is the "Partnership for Peace" and the NATO pact.

It is certain that we should keep friendly, and all other, ties with the Islamic world, which should be Bosnia-Herzegovina's comparative advantage. The military status of the federal army and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army will depend on how that process will develop, first of all in the political sense.

When it comes to the NATO alliance, it is certain that that is a long-lasting process, because we can see that no country from the east bloc has been admitted as yet. But, all the indications from the talks we have had show that the United States' long-term goal, which has taken upon itself to solve the problems of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is that Bosnia-Herzegovina, through the "Partnership for Peace," should approach the NATO alliance.

[Box, p 5]

Delusion Should Be Destroyed

[Mesetovic] What is the background of IFOR's raid on the barracks of the 4th Muslim Brigade in Konjic?

[Delic] What they said was that they had allegedly seen armed civilians coming in and going out of the barracks. I believe that that is yet another attempt to prove that in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army there are still some foreign citizens. Recently I talked with Admiral Smith about that, and I literally offered to him

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to finally destroy the delusion about foreign citizens in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army.

He said that according to his knowledge there were no foreign citizens in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army; however, that was denied already the next day by the IFOR spokesman, who said that there were foreign citizens present.

They constantly keep that "argument" against the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, and it is constantly in the air. In the barracks of the 4th Muslim Brigade they only found the soldiers and the officers of this unit.

[Box, p 5]

What Can Soldiers Buy?

[Delic] When soldiers get security papers, according to what we proposed and what will be included in the directions for their use, it will be possible to buy all real property which is owned by the state: Apartments, offices, forest, land; it will also be possible to buy shares in the companies after the process of privatization has been carried out.

We proposed that it should be possible to pay current obligations towards state institutions with these papers: Rent, electricity, telephone, water, and other communal obligations, to pay customs and taxes, too—all that which is in the competence of the state and of the state budget.

There is also a possibility that a part [of securities] could be paid out in cash, if the state secures such means. In this moment, that is hard to expect, considering the situation in the economy.

B-H: Efforts by Parties To Control Media in Tuzla Seen

96BA0234C Sarajevo FOCUS in Serbo-Croatian 22 Feb 96 p 17

[Unattributed article: "Between Bankruptcy and Desperation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the seismic political territory of Tuzla, almost all the political parties waiting for the election campaign to heat up are trying to strengthen their influence with their faithful servants—the local media, and trying to work things out as soon as possible, not being overcareful about what means they use!

The UBSD [Union of Social Democrats of Bosnia-Herzegovina] and the SDP [Social Democratic Party], who are publicly announcing some kind of coalition but secretly trying to snatch up as many of the media as possible, are a drastic example of this. The SDP is not concealing its influence on Radio Tuzla, which has been attempting to preserve its disinterest with mixed success. The UBSD is trying to achieve control over TV Tuzla, but in this case as well its luck has been changeable. The UBSD simply does not trust Tuzla TV, because it could go over to the other camp at a decisive moment. That is why immense equipment, mainly wheedled from international humanitarian organizations, has been stockpiled in the local Radio Chameleon. Many things become clearer when one learns that the owner of that radio station is Zlatko Berbic, son-in-law of Selim Beslagic. First of all, the intention to create Independent RTV Erupta Saliniana, which, alongside the present Chameleon, would also be a UBSD TV studio. The money is said to have been furnished from abroad. And that is nothing more nor less than 150,000 German marks [DM]—for a start!

This entire calculation is, nevertheless, upset by the social welfare factor and the professional factor, because personnel from Radio Tuzla have firmly decided on a divorce from TV Tuzla, which is "eating them up like a tapeworm."

At the same time, the canton TV, faithful to the SDA [Party of Democratic Action], has eaten itself up. That is, its "tapeworm" is its director Jusuf Suljkanovic, a man well known to lovers of strong drink, but at the same time utterly unknown to journalists!

In three years of effort he has not managed to put together all the necessary papers to get that TV studio operating. But at the same time he managed to take DM500,000 and buy equipment in Italy which for months now has been "rotting" in the basement of the building of the TPK [Tuzla-Drina Canton] government.

What is this unfortunate Suljkanovic going to be told by ministers of the government and deputies in the TPK Assembly when someone recalls the open secret that TV TPK has neither a board of directors, nor a programming council, nor an accounting department, nor financial books, nor a cashier's office, and quite frequently no editor in chief or managing editor either? And why do they need those things when all of that together is being performed "successfully" by Jusuf Suljkanovic?!? The personnel of that studio have recently gone on strike for two days. Instead of the regular broadcast of the nightly news, the clock face of the test signal was on the screen for hours! Malicious tongues the next morning said that this had actually been their best edition of the nightly news.

Dilettantism, arrogance, and immorality on the part of Jusuf Suljkanovic threatened to become the trademark of that studio. Some deputies in the TPK Assembly and ministers in the government seem not to be very worried

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because "Jusuf does what he is told, although he is not very smart."

If everything we have said about the Tuzla media chaos is borne in mind, given the thirst for power and tactlessness of certain local politicians, nothing good can be expected of the upcoming election in September!

Lord, protect the innocent and help them to survive the approach of the enemy of all enemies: steadily growing human stupidity!

B-H: Bihac Police Chief Denies Organizing 'Terrorist Group'

AU1104110396 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 11 Apr 96 p 6

[Article by N.R.: "The Terrorists Are Not From Bihac"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bihac—The head of the Interior Ministry [MUP] department in Bihac, Edhem Veladzic, made a statement for VECERNJI LIST regarding the terrorist group recently caught in Croatia.

"As the head of the Una-Sana Canton's MUP, I am not familiar with any terrorist group caught in the territory of Croatia, and reportedly those persons are nationals of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Here in Bihac we have received the news with great surprise, in which, true, it is not specifically said that the group was organized here, and that among its members there are some of our staff. We are still awaiting official information from the Republic of Croatia, because at the moment we do not know exactly what it is all about, or who is involved. Therefore, I resolutely refute all allegations that our service organized such a terrorist group. According to official information we have already received, the public will be officially informed on what that group is like, and where it came from," Veladzic said.

B-H: Nine Serb Tanks Seized in Kalesija Exclusion Zone

AU1204131396 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE (European edition) in Serbo-Croatian 12 Apr 96 p 16

[Article by E. Huremovic: "Nine Serb Tanks Captured"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Two days ago [10 April] the Implementation Force [IFOR] captured five Serb T-34 tanks in the general region of Kalesija. Yesterday U.S. IFOR soldiers captured an additional four tanks in the same area. The first five tanks were captured on the road from Crni Vrh, near Capardi, going toward the village of Karakaj near Zvornik, while yesterday's action was carried out in the vicinity of Paprace (Sekovici municipality). The tanks were supposed to be hauled off to the the U.S. Army 1st Cavalry battalion base in Kalesija. The crews were in the tanks at the time of their capture, but the Serb soldiers were subsequently freed.

The nine tanks were caught in the 10-km exclusion zone, from which they should have withdrawn long before. Why they had not done so is still unknown. Lack of fuel, normally an acute problem in the Serb entity, was certainly not the real reason, because the tanks were caught in movement. According to what we have learned so far, there are no indications that any additional armored vehicles are possibly located in the region. So far, this has been the greatest violation of the military part of the Dayton accord.

B-H: Karadzic Blamed for Serb 'Boycott' of Donor Conference

AU1104154496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 11 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Carl Bildt considers that the Serb entity has excluded itself from the donor conference in Brussels and that war criminal Karadzic is responsible for this decision, Carl Bildt's spokesman Colum Murphy stated today in Sarajevo.

We consider that the boycott by the Serb entity will not help the peace process and it is the ordinary people there who will pay the price for this decision. We see this as the exclusion of the Serb entity from the process of postwar reconstruction, Murphy stated.

B-H: Steiner Blames Karadzic for Serb Absence

AU1204121896 Paris AFP in English 1128 GMT 12 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, April 12 (AFP)—A senior UN official hit out at Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic after Serb delegates failed to turn up at a key meeting Friday designed to firm up the peace process.

None of the expected representatives of the Serb-held towns of Bijeljina, Brcko, Doboj, Modrica and Zvornik showed up at the second meeting of a joint civilian commission covering northeast Bosnia.

Michael Steiner, principal deputy to high representative Carl Bildt, the top civilian official overseeing the peace process in Bosnia, said so he had been given the excuse of the Orthodox Easter weekend.

But he told the other delegates at the start of the session: "I am quite astonished to hear that, given the fact that so far nobody had any problems with that date.

"I have rather the impression the non-participation of representatives from the Republika Srpska [Serb Re-

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public] is the result of last-minute instructions coming out of Pale," the Bosnian Serb capital.

"Mr. Karadzic is making again a severe mistake," he added.

The meeting, to be attended by delegates of towns in the Moslem-Croat federation and from international bodies such as the World Bank and aid agencies, was arranged last month after the commission was launched.

On the agenda for the meeting here, which was expected to last all day, was economic reconstruction, freedom of movement and missing and displaced persons.

B-H: Krajisnik on Why Serbs Cannot Attend Brussels Conference

LD1104174596 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1639 GMT 11 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 11 Apr (SRNA)—Momcilo Krajisnik, the speaker of the Serb Republic People's Assembly, said today that some influential circles in the international community were trying to exclude the Serb Republic from the international donors' conference in Brussels by conditioning its participation by demanding that it be part of a joint Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation.

"These circles have also been setting completely unreasonable demands regarding technical issues in connection with the release of prisoners. Now that we have fulfilled their demands and have released POW's, we are being told to take part in some joint delegation that is in contravention of the Dayton agreement," Krajisnik said in a statement for SRNA.

He recalled that the Serb Republic had agreed to take part in the conference and even expressed gratitude to Carl Bildt, the high envoy for civilian issues, for having invited it.

"These new demands regarding our participation are completely unacceptable and it is obvious that someone wishes to disqualify the Serb Republic as an entity. According to the Dayton agreement, there is no such a thing as a Bosnia-Herzegovina government, only an interim commission. After the elections, the setting up of the council of ministers is the only thing that the agreement provides for," Krajisnik said.

Denying allegations that the Serb Republic has excluded itself from the donors' conference, Speaker Krajisnik said that some circles "obviously wanted the discriminatory policy toward the Serbs to continue and the reconstruction funds to be sent only to the Croat-Muslim Federation."

"In the previous arrangement, the Serb Republic was part of the joint Yugoslav delegation; now it is insisted that it be part of united delegation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We cannot accept the scenario that shows that only Bosnia-Herzegovina exists and the Serb Republic does not," Krajisnik said.

Recalling that "the Serb Republic has accepted that Bosnia-Herzegovina be formed as a thin roof over two entities," Krajisnik appealed to the international community not to attempt, by prejudiced interpretations of the Dayton agreement, to create stronger ties between the entities than envisaged by the peace plan.

Krajisnik said that the Serb Republic representatives will continue their political activities aimed at the participation at the conference.

"It is not our goal to exclude the Serb Republic from the negotiations, and we hope that Carl Bildt, as an experienced and wise politician, will find a way to overcome an enforced problem," Krajisnik said.

Krajisnik described the news that the Brussels conference will be held with or without the Serb Republic representatives as a clear sign that the Muslims' mentors wanted to exclude Serbs from the division of funds for the reconstruction.

The speaker denied claims that the Serb Republic representatives agreed, at a meeting of the interim commission in Banja Luka on 30 March, to appear as part of a united delegation, adding that it was pointed out even then that any joint appearance under the umbrella of the so-called government of Bosnia-Herzegovina was unacceptable for the Serb Republic.

"The Serb Republic leadership is completely unanimous regarding this and other issues and we will insist on the strict implementation of the Dayton agreement," Krajisnik said in conclusion.

B-H: Observers Say Karadzic 'Back in Charge' of B-H Serbs

AU1104161196 Paris AFP in English 1542 GMT 11 Apr 96

[Report by Peter Cunliffe-Jones]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, April 11 (AFP)—Radovan Karadzic is back in charge of the Bosnian Serbs, pulling strings and threatening the peace process in Bosnia, diplomats and officials said here Thursday [11 April].

The re-emergence of a hardliner such as Karadzic "is bad news," said a senior diplomat at a European embassy in Sarajevo. "It is going to give the international community one hell of a headache," he added.

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After nearly four years of war, Bosnia is due to hold elections in September and is badly in need of "some moderate leadership," a Western official charged with the elections process said.

But Karadzic led the Serb nationalist drive in Bosnia, setting off a war in which over 200,000 people were killed and more than two million lost their homes, and does not qualify.

Under the Dayton peace treaty, he is persona non grata in Bosnia and cannot stand in elections, but has said he put himself forward regardless.

The signs of Karadzic's re-emergence as the leader of the Bosnian Serbs came earlier this week after several months in which he kept a low profile, fearful, according to Western sources, of arrest for war crimes.

A personal decision on March 30 by Serb Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic to attend a major donor conference taking place in Brussels Friday was "overridden by Karadzic" Wednesday and Kasagic was forced to say he would not attend.

"Kasagic is being suppressed. Karadzic appears back in charge," the diplomat said.

The first sign of Karadzic's re-emergence in charge of the Serb political system came at a meeting in Pale earlier this month in the self-styled Serb assembly.

Karadzic lambasted the "mistakes" of those who he said were allowing a liberal interpretation of the Dayton treaty and vowed to continue the main drive of the war—carving out a separate Serb state—but this time by "peaceful" means.

Kasagic, the prime minister, failed to appear.

Colum Murphy, a spokesman for the top civilian official overseeing the Bosnian peace process, said Thursday Karadzic had re-emerged as the main power in the Srpska Republika.

"What we are seeing certainly is a re-emergence of a hardline group (headed by Karadzic) which is disquieting," Murphy told a briefing here.

It "raises important questions about the peace process and about the implementation of the Dayton agreement as we enter the next few months," Murphy said.

Karadzic, a 50-year-old former psychiatrist, extreme nationalist and self-styled poet, was charged last July by the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia with genocide, violations of the Geneva conventions, crimes against humanity and violations of the laws and customs of war.

Under Dayton, Bosnia is split into Serb and Moslem-Croat entities joined by a fledgling central government. Karadzic does not accept the central government, which would ruin his dream of a separate Bosnian Serb state, hence the non-attendance in Brussels.

"There's a lot of attraction in going and arresting Karadzic, but there's a lot of risk as well," noted the European diplomat, who agreed to speak on condition of anonymity.

The NATO-led Implementation Force [IFOR], which is charged with arresting war criminals if it finds them, has so far been "cautious" because of fears of upsetting the Serbs and "throwing Srpska Republika out of the process," he added.

The former warring parties still have a lot of heavy weapons "loose" in the countryside which will only be garrisoned on April 18, IFOR notes.

In the last Serb-held area of Sarajevo, the tiny Serb corner of the Dobrinja suburb, opinions among Serbs differ on what should happen to Karadzic.

"Karadzic, and all the nationalists, should go if Bosnia is to have peace," one young Serb told AFP in Dobrinja earlier this week.

The European diplomat agreed.

"Sooner or later we're going to have to face up to the problem," he said.

B-H: Kasagic Seen as 'Serious Rival' to Karadzic

AU1204064696 Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 5 Apr 96 pp 19-20

[Article by Dragan Janjic (BETA): "The Rise of the Prime Minister"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Rajko Kasagic, Bosnian Serb prime minister, has "serious problems" in his relationship with the political leadership of the Serb Republic [RS], well-informed sources close to the Bosnian Serb authorities claim. According to these sources, Kasagic told RS President Radovan Karadzic and Assembly Chairman Momcilo Krajisnik during a recent meeting that he could no longer obey them in everything they say.

At the same time, some Serb sources in Belgrade claim that the prime minister has taken steps to strengthen his position and that he has been complaining over the past 10 days to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic about the pressure that Karadzic and his aides have been putting on him.

Connoisseurs of the political circumstances among the Bosnian Serbs assess that, basically, the reason for the

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conflict between Kasagic and the political leadership of the RS are certain differences in their opinions regarding issues that involve the implementation of the Dayton accords and the position of the RS. The prime minister advocates closer relations with the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the establishment of a collective system of payment operations, while the political leadership of the RS sees in that a danger for the independence of the state created by the Bosnian Serbs in the course of the war.

Kasagic, being an outspoken pragmatist, wants to reinforce his position as prime minister and to use his office to influence economic, as well as political developments in the Serb entity, at the same time strongly relying on Belgrade. Karadzic and Krajisnik, however, see a threat for their own positions in Kasagic's rising popularity in the RS, as well as in Belgrade and among representatives of the international community.

The current prime minister of the Bosnian Serbs is the first personality in the political leadership of the Serb entity in Bosnia whose position is strong enough to enable him to turn to Belgrade for assistance in his disagreements with Karadzic, without having to sustain severe criticisms or fear removal. The fact that he has retained his position, and that his influence is even growing, is interpreted as yet another serious sign of the weakening power of the central authorities in Pale and proof of Belgrade's increasing influence on the major military and political affairs of the Bosnian Serbs.

Ever since he was appointed prime minister several months ago, Kasagic has proven to be a moderate man who is willing to talk. In public appearances, he, as a rule, does not use harsh words and avoids pathetic statements and big promises that he believes he is not able to keep. He sticks to the theory about the importance of the restoration of economic contacts with all the former Yugoslav republics, as well as with the other entity, namely, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Journalists have noticed that, even with his refined appearance, he stands out considerably from his environment, which, particularly when speaking of Western officials with whom he talks, is not unimportant.

Karadzic was not too willing to appoint Kasagic as prime minister. He was forced to do that late last year, yielding to Belgrade's strong influence, in view of the growing internal pressure on the political leadership in Pale and particularly the dissatisfaction in the region of Banja Luka. Before he assumed his current office, Kasagic was chairman of the city government in Banja Luka. He was thought to be quite close to the Bosnian Serbs' leader, but still not enjoying his full confidence. By his appointment, Karadzic tried to appease the strong regional resistance in Banja Luka and also to promote the new image in politics, void of bellicose threats.

Kasagic carefully avoids making public statements on global political issues, thereby implying that his position has more to do with executive authority. Political observers in Banja Luka say, however, that his views are not essentially different from the line forced at the moment by Karadzic and Krajisnik. According to those sources, he supports a strong position in economic issues and never takes into consideration the development needs of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole, but sticks to the Serb entity, for which he believes it is necessary to establish good economic relations with the Federation.

His moves to force economic cooperation, as well as advocating the reopening of traffic and other connections with the former Yugoslav republics and the world, are meeting with growing support among executives of medium- and large-size companies, particularly in the Banja Luka region. In his public promotion of such measures, Kasagic relies predominantly on two major factors—the domestic one, largely based on support for him in the Banja Luka area, and the external one, reflected by his ever stronger reliance on Belgrade.

Ten days or so before the Bosnian Serb assembly session (held on Monday and Tuesday, 1 and 2 April), a rumor spread among the Banja Luka businessmen that Pale might exert pressure on Kasagic, and even demand a vote of no confidence in him in the assembly. There were no official confirmations of this rumor, but it obviously upset many prominent citizens of Banja Luka. They even began to lobby the assembly deputies from that region in order to prevent or at least make any possible attempt to remove Kasagic more difficult. Objectively, businessmen see in Kasagic a man who is capable of creating the conditions for new business deals, and their interest in the political destiny of the prime minister is based exclusively on their economic interest.

Increasingly open support for Kasagic is also being expressed by opposition parties in Banja Luka. Criticisms of the central authorities predominantly refer to Karadzic and Krajisnik, while the prime minister is bypassed or even praised openly. It seems that he is particularly esteemed by the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic. This party is an extended arm of the ruling Serbian socialists, which is further proof of the theory about Kasagic's close connections with Belgrade.

Objectively seen, the current circumstances are favorable for Kasagic, and his popularity and influence is growing steadily. The Bosnian Serbs desperately wish to have any sort of serious support and protection, and

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the only place where they can find and get this is Belgrade. Therefore, it is logical to expect that, in elections, they will favor people who are supported by Milosevic, of course, provided they show strength in dealing with domestic policy issues as well. Kasagic fulfills all these requirements, and, given Serbia's stronger support, he could easily become Karadzic's first serious rival.

Observers in Banja Luka claim that Kasagic's significance has apparently increased so much that, in the event of a direct attack on the prime minister by Karadzic and an attempt to remove him, a severe reaction from western Bosnia would follow. The prime minister could become a sort of leader of Banja Luka Krajina, strongly supported by Belgrade. Such a conflict would necessarily have a regional character and could seriously endanger the RS. If that happens, observers count on a short-term success for Karadzic, but expect that, in the long run, the prime minister would emerge the victor.

B-H: UNHCR Criticized for 13 Inmates' 'Forced Detention'

AU1104202896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 11 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The forced detention of the 13 inmates at the Sljivovica camp in Serbia against their clearly stated wish to return to their homeland is yet more proof of the Belgrade regime's active participation in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The inmates were already on buses when they were ordered to get off and return to the camp, it is said in a statement issued by Amor Masovic, chairman of the State Commission for Missing Persons.

The Belgrade UNHCR office bears equal responsibility for this (?perfidous) act, whose chairman not only did not prevent the inmates from being taken off the bus, but also did not allow the inmates, who had previously expressed the desire to leave for third countries, to depart, but had in the meantime decided to return to Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is a clear violation of the agreement reached between the government delegation and the head of the UNHCR office following the delegation's recent visit to the Sljivovica camp. According to the agreement, the inmates have a right to make the final decision on repatriation or deportation to a third country until the final departure of buses from the camp. This right was denied to them yesterday. The incident is even graver in view of the fact that many family members have been separated—for example, sons from fathers or one brother from the other. It is obvious that there is still a connection between the Belgrade and Pale regimes. Consequently, the decision of High Representative Carl Bildt on the participation of the Serb entity at the conference is premature.

B-H: Mladic Reportedly Seen During Executions Near Zvornik

AU1104201896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 11 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] An investigating team from the Hague Tribunal today began searching the elementary school in Grbavci after hearing claims that more than 1,000 Bosniaks had been killed there. The investigators searched schoolrooms and the schoolyard in this eastern Bosnian village, 15 km south of Zvornik, to try to locate evidence of the massacre that, according to witness reports, took place last summer.

The school is only 200 meters from where Tribunal investigators have already investigated and which is believed to be a mass grave of several hundred Bosniaks. Human bones and clothes were found there last week.

According to survivors' accounts, prisoners were brought to the school before being executed. They also claim that war criminal Ratko Mladic was seen at the school during the executions. One of the team members has confirmed that the school and the schoolyard were used as a concentration camp for prisoners.

B-H: Bosnian Serbs, Italians Discuss Future Economic Ties

LD1104234996 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2338 GMT 11 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 11 (TANJUG)—President of the (Bosnian Serb) Republika Srpska's Chamber of Commerce Bozidar Antic and a delegation of the Italian Union of Chambers of Commerce discussed chances of establishing economic ties in Belgrade on Thursday.

Antic said that the Republika Srpska, as one of two constitutional entities in the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina, could become Italy's very important business partner.

He informed the Italian delegation about the Republika Srpska's economic potential, emphasizing that its priorities were to develop a market economy, achieve complete privatization and create small and medium-sized firms on the Italian model.

Italian Union of Chambers of Commerce President Danilo Longhi, who heads the delegation, said that information about the Republika Srpska's investment opportunities had been submitted to 100 Italian chambers of commerce and 80 firms, and hoped for their success.

He said that a cooperation accord might be signed between the Italian Union of Chambers of Commerce and the Chamber of Commerce of the Republika Srpska, and invited Bosnian Serb firms to display in the europartnership exposition in Genoa later this year.

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Croatia: Bosnian Embassy Says Abdic Sent 'Terrorists'

AU1104141296 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 11 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by I. Toma: "Those Are Abdic's Men!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb—At the Embassy of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Zagreb officials are denying the possibility that the group of terrorists from Bosnia-Herzegovina caught on Thursday in Senj intended to assassinate Fikret Abdic. The officials are saying that it is most probably a group of Abdic's own followers, whose aim was to disturb good relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The chief advisor to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Embassy in Zagreb, Sead Hadzagic, told us that he had received notification from the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as late as on Tuesday [9 April] around 1830.

"There are many illogical things about the case. Bosnia-Herzegovina is being accused of terrorism while, on the other hand, there has not been any proof of such accusations. I think one is jumping to conclusions and, considering the information lately brought out in public, all sorts of things are being assumed," Hadzagic said, discarding any possibility that the terrorist group recently caught in Senj might have been backed by the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. "It is stupid even to imagine that the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina would try to assassinate Abdic. Since nobody tried that even during the war, it is crazy to imagine any such thing now happening now, when he is politically dead, and all the more so in view of the peace process being in progress," Hadzagic said.

In the statement to SLOBODNA DALMACIJA, the chief advisor to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Embassy said he believed that the group involved supporters of Abdic, who wanted to cause a conflict between Croatia and the government in Sarajevo, disturb their relations that are on a rise, and restore Abdic's influence on current political developments. Hadzagic allowed for the possibility that this event may have been staged also because of the forthcoming closing of the refugee camp in Kupljensko, from which around 75 percent of refugees returned to Velika Kladusa. "For the time being, only people who stained their hands with blood have remained in the camp, and Abdic has completely lost support among the people. His position is increasingly insecure, so now he is trying at whatever cost to draw media attention at the least," Hadzagic said.

To our question whether an investigation has begun in Bosnia-Herzegovina about the terrorist group, Hadzagic answered that, for the time being, he had no detailed information and he did not even know the names of the suspects. The chief advisor to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Embassy was therefore not able to comment on the detail that the terrorists had arrived from Bihac, but he said that the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina intended to cooperate with the Croatian authorities in order to shed light on this case.

Croatia: Accord To Reschedule Debt to Austria Signed

AU1204085296 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 10 Apr 96 p 2

[HINA report: "Agreement With Austria"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb—Croatian Finance Minister Bozo Prka signed an agreement on the rescheduling of Croatia's debt to Austria in Zagreb on Tuesday [9 April].

According to the agreement, the total debt of nearly 637 million Austrian schillings and about 7 million schillings worth of default interest have been rescheduled. The double agreement consists of an agreement on the reorganization of the debt and an agreement on the repayment of up to 650 million schillings through borrowing.

The agreement was signed by the representatives of the Austrian Government and the Oesterrichische Kontrolbank, which represents the Austrian Government, in Vienna on 4 April.

Croatia: Airport Denies Responsibility for Plane Crash

LD1104211196 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 11 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Immediately after we received this report [as heard], we received a statement by the management of Dubrovnik Airport asking us to announce the following in view of a series of untrue details published in Croatian newspapers with regards to the safety of Dubrovnik Airport:

It is untrue that carelessness on the part of the state was the cause of the tragic crash. Namely, the Croatian government offered help of 3 million kuna on 6 February 1996 and the Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and Development rescheduled the debt on 22 December 1995.

Legal obligations and professional ethics do not allow us any relaxation of the strict safety regulations in civilian air traffic and we would like to assure everyone that in any case of faulty equipment or instruments we would halt air traffic.

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We state with full responsibility the grave financial situation regarding the employees of Dubrovnik Airport, which we have mentioned in our letters to the government, has no causal or immediate connection with the tragedy of the U.S. aircraft because it did not for a moment use the equipment at Dubrovnik Airport but instead the navigation equipment which is the responsibility of the flight control.

Judging by the investigation results known so far, it has been established beyond any doubt that the navigation equipment worked without any fault. It has been established that the procedure for the approach (of the plane), published in the flight control bulletin, is identical to the procedure published in the approach chart of the U.S. Jebsen Company.

It has been established that the aircraft did not follow the prescribed approach procedure. Inspectors of the French air force had checked the equipment and instruments at Dubrovnik airport before this tragedy and established that they were in line with international standards.

This is why we would like to firmly refute any insinuation regarding the safety of this airport and we shall take all measures prescribed by law and seek compensation through a lawsuit for the damage caused by the above untruths, the statement by Dubrovnik airport says.

Croatia: UN Administrator on Problems in E. Slavonia

LD1004163796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1450 GMT 10 Apr 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vukovar, Apr 10 (TANJUG)—U.N. administrator of the Srem-Baranja Region Jacques Klein said Wednesday that if Serbs were possibly to leave, the U.N. mission (UNTAES) [UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia] would not have succeeded.

Klein, a U.S. diplomat, told a news conference at Klisa Airport near Vukovar that he would do everything to keep the region multi-ethnic just as it was before the war.

The Srem-Baranja Region is the only part of the Republic of Serb Krajina not occupied by Croatia in offensives launched in May and August last year.

The Republic of Serb Krajina was created by the local Serbs in response to Croatia's war of secession from the Former Yugoslavia on a territory on which their ancestors had lived for centuries.

Croatia's aggression on the western, southern and northern parts of the Republic of Serb Krajina in May and August last year led to an exodus of more than 250,000 Serbs.

Klein denied the existence of any list with the names of Serbs to be arrested on war crimes charges.

He said he would insist that Croatia's authorities regulate as soon as possible the issue of the discontinuance of judicial proceedings.

When asked whether the settling of any larger number of Serb refugees in the Srem-Baranja Region or migration of local Serbs had been recorded, Klein said there had been no major movements of people.

Klein denied reports on the burning of Croatian and ethnic-Hungarian homes in Laslovo and the shelling of the village by Serb artillery from nearby.

He said it had been established that Serb villagers had burned chaff in the fields, due to which several land mines had exploded.

Klein said the removing of hundreds of thousands of land mines in the Srem-Baranja Region would be a very hard job since the United Nations did not have the necessary equipment.

The U.N. administrator commended both the Serb and Croatian sides for cooperating in the implementation of the agreement signed in November 1995, although both encountered opposition in their environments.

Gen. Joseph Schoups said the most important military UNTAES tasks were the demilitarization of both sides, the aiding of a voluntary and safe return of refugees and displaced persons, the maintaining of peace and enabling of the U.N. personnel to do their job.

The Belgian general said that if UNTAES members were denied the freedom of movement, he would secure it if need be by means of force.

General Schoups said, if necessary, he would use to that end the support of NATO aircraft in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Croatia: Democrats' Chief Says Muslims Postpone Deadlines

LD1104170696 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 11 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The political and security situation and the implementation of the Sarajevo Agreement were the main topics of a press conference given in Mostar today by the chairman of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bozo Rajic. Anton Mrkonjic has this report:

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[Begin recording] [Mrkonjic] The Sarajevo Agreement precisely sets out the timescale and the people responsible for the realization of certain tasks. By boycotting assembly sessions of cantons six and seven, the Muslim side is directly to blame for the postponement of deadlines determined by the Sarajevo agreement, Chairman Rajic said adding:

[Rajic] Croat representatives approached this job with responsibility and have fulfilled their obligations. As is visible from the report that has just been presented to us, Bosniak-Muslim representatives either did not accept the timescale for the assembly sessions, did not attend them at all or did not attend them in sufficient numbers to make a quorum, bring into question the regularity of holding assembly sessions.

We have had to make this public for our own people and also for international representatives, as we received an invitation from Mr. Steiner yesterday for a meeting on Saturday at which we should discuss some open issues on deadlines, primarily those referring to the establishment of interim municipal councils in the municipalities of Bugojno, Vares, Stolac and Capljina.

[Mrkonjic] In continuation of the press conference, speaking about infiltration of a group of terrorists from Bosnia-Herzegovina into Croatia, Bozo Rajic said that the terrorist group is a product of [Izetbegovic's government] Agency for Research and Documentation, of which the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina is afraid.

[Rajic] It is very difficult to separate this agency's operations from incidents that can be linked with the terrorist group infiltrated in the Republic of Croatia, most probably tasked with eliminating Fikret Abdic. I am deeply convinced that it has more than one task. However, it would be too early to come to any conclusions.

[Mrkonjic] Journalists asked Chairman Rajic to comment on an interview that Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic gave to Sarajevo TV just before Easter. According to Rajic, Izetbegovic voiced a few unacceptable and significant remarks on the Croat people. Bozo Rajic said it was unacceptable that Izetbegovic should distinguish between good and bad Croats and Serbs, which amounted to constant pressure to show loyalty to one nation and state, which also belongs to the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. What is interesting is Izetbegovic's readiness to support Haris Silajdzic who allegedly wishes to rally all forces in favor of Bosnia-Herzegovina, even at the price of breaking up the Muslim ranks, if that leads to the breaking up of the Croat and Serb ranks, Rajic said in conclusion of his press conference. [end recording]

Croatia: Vukovar Serbs Choose New Assembly Chairman

AU1104175296 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 8 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Miroslav Keravica is the new chairman of the Vukovar Municipal Assembly. This was decided at the extraordinary session of the Vukovar municipal assembly session, which began on 5 April and ended this afternoon. Sanja Vukicevic has more about the appointment of the new assembly chairman and other decisions made at the session.

[Begin recording] Mr. Miroslav Keravica was appointed new chairman of the Vukovar municipal assembly by 37 votes out of the 39 deputies present at the session. The municipal assembly has 53 deputies. Miroslav Keravica, the new chairman of the Vukovar municipal assembly, pointed out that the appointment is a major challenge for him, because people must first of all be told to stay here and there is no need to leave the district, as another 15,000 to 20,000 refugees from the Republic of Serb Krajina must be brought here. "It will be hard, but I will see to it that legal bodies of the assembly of the Srijem-Baranja district be formed and I will also be backing plans for the revitalization of production and the settlement, which will be discussed at the next session of the Vukovar municipal assembly," said Miroslav Keravica, chairman of the Vukovar municipal assembly.

The resignation of Dragutin Bolic, deputy chairman of the Vukovar municipal assembly, was accepted by 35 votes. It was agreed that the president and all members of the executive council of the Vukovar municipality be dismissed, something that will be discussed at the next session of the Vukovar municipal assembly on Friday at 10 o'clock. Drazenko Djokic of Negotovci, who was a deputy in the assembly, was appointed the new vice president of the Vukovar municipal assembly. The proposal to form the assembly of the Srijem-Baranja district as soon as possible was agreed unanimously and the proposal is already being considered by the municipalities. Miroslav Keravica, chairman of the Vukovar municipal assembly, remains a member of the council of the Srijem-Baranja district until the assembly is formed. [end recording]

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Croatia: Serbian Plan Said To Be Behind Prevlaka Claim

AU1104124496 Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 1 Apr 96 pp 12-14

[Article by "geopolitician" Mladen Klemencic: "The Secret Serbian Plan for Prevlaka"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Prevlaka question, or to be more precise the Ostri Peninsula and Cape, is one of the most stable and long-lasting territorial questions that arose due to the break up of the former Yugoslav federation. What is characteristic is that there has practically been no progress on any kind of agreement on this issue. For Croatia this issue does not even exist as a territorial matter because, de jure, everything is clear and, de facto, we are also close to a final solution. However, the other side constantly continues to keep the issue open, and one can conclude that it is of exceptional importance for them. When mentioning "the other side," one is addressing not one but at least three actors on the scene. One of them is Montenegro, with its capital in Podgorica, that actually borders on Croatia in that area. The second is Serbia and Belgrade. Thanks to the Serb-Montenegrin federation, it is the federal leadership that holds the authority on the international level, and not the republic's leadership. In the end, there is the "Serb Republic" or the Serb unit in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which since recently also has a certain international legitimacy. It was already a participant in the Prevlaka issue.

There are a few standard "justifications" on the basis of which the three Yugoslav sides are counting on Prevlaka. They are of different natures, but what they have in common is that all three are just as unconvincing. The Montenegrin reason mentioned most often is the ostensible security threat to the bay due to the Croat presence on one of the capes that block entrance into the bay. For this reason, the security of ships sailing into and out of the bay is supposedly threatened. The principle of "geographic unity of the bay" is often added to this. If this were to be implemented the entire bay would belong to Montenegro, that is, to "Yugoslavia." None of these reasons has a valid foundation. International law is a very well worked out collection of rules and regulations particularly in the area of maritime boundaries. However, it does not recognize such a principle. The political division of a bay between two or three countries is decided by the point at which the land boundary meets the sea. If this point is within the bay, as is the case at Kotor Bay, there is no principle that would refuse the right of the coastal state to participate in the maritime area of the bay without regard to the configuration of the area. Moreover, international law does not recognize militarily strategic reasons that would give one state the right to "throw out" the other country from the area of the bay. Last of all, even if the entrance to the bay were to be divided between two countries, the Montenegrin, or "Yugoslav" side still has a wide enough and deep enough half of the bay entrance.

Triple Exchange

Croatia giving up Prevlaka or Zagreb agreeing to a change of the borders would mean a lot to the other side in terms of prestige. It would serve as proof of Croat "guilt" in the eyes of the domestic and international public and would be a justification for the aggression in 1991. This would be especially desirable from the point of view of the Montenegrins who support the idea of a greater Serbia. Considering the fact that the Montenegrins took part in the aggression in the Dubrovnik area in 1991 in great numbers, and thus brought shame upon themselves; the acquisition of Prevlaka would justify that obviously imprudent action. Belgrade would also welcome some propaganda for the same reasons. However, we must consider that Belgrade needs a cover for a significantly wider scope of aggression. The question arises as to how convincing the Prevlaka issue would be especially to the Serbian public.

The combination most often used, and which is worked out in greatest detail, is the so-called triple exchange. According to this option, Croatia would give up Prevlaka and receive compensation in the form of land in the hinterland of Dubrovnik. The last time, and we believe also the very last time, that this option was mentioned was immediately after the Dayton talks. This option is the most complex, as well as most indicative of the other side's real intentions. The realization of this plan would mean Croatia, unlike previous suggestions, giving up not only Prevlaka, but also part of the Konaval area east of Cilipi. Because of the lay of the land and the extension of the border line, the "Serb Republic" simply cannot reach Prevlaka without at least a part of the Konaval area.

Naturally Croatia has no good reason to agree to such an exchange. Moral reasons, reasons of principle, reasons of international law, and all other reasons speak for Croatia staying on Prevlaka. In particular, there is no reason for Croatia to agree to it, because, ever since the internal Bosnia-Herzegovina borders were determined in Dayton, the Dubrovnik hinterland belongs to the Bosnian Federation. One should note, however, Belgrade's stubbornness and its persistence on the "triple exchange." It is a triple exchange only because of the interests of Belgrade. Montenegro receives nothing

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because the territorial addition is intended for the "Serb Republic."

This stubbornness is somewhat unclear because of the necessity for the "Serb Republic" to have access to the sea. The "Serb Republic" could satisfy its maritime needs, which objectively are not great, with transit through neighboring and "brotherly" Montenegro. Moreover, the Konaval coast southeast of Cavtat is less than convenient for the creation of a maritime port. If one also considers the time needed to build transportation connections, roads and especially railroads, it is obvious that the "Serb Republic" will not be able to find the necessary means.

The Importance—Also Because of Montenegro

After breaking down [rasclamba] the argumentation that has been presented so far, one should draw attention to the fact that the current situation in Prevlaka and around it is actually perfectly acceptable to all sides. Prevlaka is officially Croatian, although UN observers are located on the peninsula itself. Their presence does not bother Croatia because they do not limit the everyday life of even the closest Konaval village of Vitaljina. In the meantime, the Montenegrin, or Yugoslav, side practices smuggling without being obstructed. Since there are no Croatian border services in Prevlaka, they do not obstruct the Italian and "Yugoslav" smugglers in their important work. Nor are they obstructed by the observers. Even the international community can be (and is) satisfied with the current situation, considering that a small (around 25 people) and therefore cheap observer unit is maintaining the total peace and is thus finally fulfilling its mission in one area.

The analysis so far shows that there are no real reasons for disputes. However, the stubbornness of the Yugoslav side does point in the other direction. This fact means that, apart from the already mentioned reasons, there are other, less public reasons for the importance of Prevlaka. It seems that one can find these reasons if one puts the entire story into a wider context than has been done so far, and also in a regional, ideological, and strategic context. If all this is viewed in the context of the lasting plans for a greater Serbia, then the issue of Prevlaka receives a new dimension. In this regard, we are talking less of an amputation of the southeastern end part of Croatian territory, although it is always a part of the plan, but more of the pacification of the federal partner that is not sufficiently reliable—Montenegro. How important Montenegro is for Serbia could be seen from the recently shown British television series entitled "The Death of Yugoslavia." One would have to remember Jovic's commentary on the situation in autumn 1991, when Montenegrin President Bulatovic briefly accepted Lord Carrington's [former EU mediator] plan, or in other words, turned his back on Belgrade. In the series Jovic calls this the "deepest crisis between our leaderships." Zagreb did not consider Bulatovic's disloyalty to be quite so serious.

Two "Montenegrin Branches"

A key regional point in the scenario of the final pacification of the federal partner is the main training area of the "Army of Yugoslavia," for which the Pester Plateau was chosen. The plateau is bordered by Golija Mountain in the north and approximately by the Serb-Montenegrin border in the south. All the recent main military exercises have been held there, and they are also very frequent. The training area, as well as all of Montenegro, are, according to the currently valid military zone division, part of the zone of responsibility of the 2d Army, which has its headquarters in Podgorica. However, the Pester training area is the main point of concentration for the entire area. Considering its location, the plateau cuts through the historical area of the Novi Pazar Sandzak. It thus not only separates the western, mainly Muslim, part from the eastern, mainly Serb part, but also separates it from the Bosnia-Herzegovina border. This is even more important. If necessary, other action from Pester could be directed at Kosovo, as support for the forces that are already stationed there in order to pacify that (once) autonomous region. Well, the main object of observation from the Pestar "observation point" is, however, Montenegro. That is where the two branches that would cut Montenegro off from Croatia and Albania would have to originate from. The Montenegrin core would thus find itself within a complete Serb "embrace," in order for the final blow to be struck against what would remain of the "usury" [zelenastvo], that is, Montenegrin autonomy. The left branch of this "final embrace" goes through the "believing" "Serb Republic" and reaches the sea through the current Croat territory in Konaval, including Prevlaka. This is why the "Serb Republic's" access to the sea is more important to Belgrade than Prevlaka itself. This is because only this buffer would completely separate Montenegro from Croatia. A variation on this scenario includes Montenegro formally annexing the Prevlaka peninsula, on the condition that the "Serb Republic" would have access to the sea. It is clear that for Croatia such a scenario means not only the amputation of Prevlaka but also a (larger) part of the Konaval area. The other branch of the "embrace" has the goal of the Serbianization [posrbljavanje] of the Montenegrin-Albanian border area. As it is known, that part of Montenegro is populated by Albanians. Considering the fact that they are an unknown element, the demographic structure needs to be changed artificially. This will be done with the construction of a

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new naval port close to Ulcinj at Valdanos. The move of the "Yugoslav" navy from Kotor Bay to Valdanos is, in fact, already taking place. When the new port is ready, it will become a strong military base. When all the branches of the army are complete, the military personnel and the accompanying services, all, with their families, will be new elements that are loyal to Belgrade. They will execute the pacification and disable any possible anti-Serb connection between Montenegro and Albania. Along with this comes, of course, Podgorica, where a critical mass of loyalists has also been created around the army center. However, if a "silent suppression" would not be enough to break Montenegrin resistance, there is still the possibility of a decisive strike from the Pester training ground.

Croatia Is Not the Main Goal

The aforementioned scenario makes Belgrade's interest in Prevlaka understandable, and the importance of Prevlaka is shown in its entirety in a new dimension. Considering the fact that Belgrade is truly interested in the pacification of Montenegro, the pressure on Croatia regarding Prevlaka will continue. The intensity of the pressure will be an indicator of the validity of the scenario as described here. Only when Belgrade gives up its rationally inexplicable support for the "Serb Republic's" access to the sea, withdraws its demand for the revision of the border at Prevlaka, and recognizes Croatia with its current, internationally recognized borders will we be convinced of a real strategic reformation and that they have abandoned their policy of a greater Serbia. Until that happens, this scenario is probable and one should keep it in mind. As mentioned before, the goal here is not Croatia, at least no more than it has been so far. There is therefore no reason for alarm. In the past few years, Belgrade has probably given enough proof that it is not to be trusted easily, especially not after a few symbolical and not too convincing moves and statements. What is more worrying is the naivete of the international intermediaries, who are ready to forgive Belgrade for anything until they are truly convinced of Belgrade's real intentions. Other worrying factors are the uncertainty of the real situation in Montenegro and the uncertainty of the readiness and will of the Montenegrins to unmask the Belgrade scenario in time.

Croatia: Comment: State Being 'Blackmailed' by International Community

96BA0233A Zagreb HRVATSKO SLOVO in Serbo-Croatian 9 Feb 96 p 1

[Commentary by Dubravko Horvatic: "Damocles' Sword Over Our Croatia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A certain Milan Milanovic, head of the Serb negotiators from the still occupied Croatian Podunavlje region, recently declared the following in Beli Manastir, in Croatian Baranja: "Croat refugees have no right to return home until Serb refugees receive appropriate compensation for their lost property and until they (those who want to go back to their centuries-old homesteads) are allowed to return." The ultimatum-like tone that emanates from these words could lead ill-informed people to think they were voiced by a member of some rebel army and not a member of an army that was soundly defeated by the Croatian Forces [HV] in several campaigns. Similar things are being said by Veljko Dzakula, the secretary of Pupovac's Serbian Democratic Forum, who was captured and disarmed in Operation Flash by Veljko Barbieri, a major in the HV known to readers of HRVATSKO SLOVO through his regular column "Notes From the War." According to that negotiator, 80,000 Serbs have moved into Croatian Podunavlje (which of course he does not call by that name). We know that all of them fled the Croatian Forces in fear because of the crimes that they had committed, from murder to looting, and another 30,000 of them are expected in this region over the next few months. Nevertheless, some of them—because of their clear consciences or the indulgence of the Croatian authorities—do want to return to their "centuries-old homesteads." Obviously they are taking advantage of the fact that, to be blunt, the Croatian state is actually being blackmailed by the so-called international community, which one way or another, by way of some of its representatives, is threatening the independent Republic of Croatia with the creation of some sort of absurd federation, confederation, or similar artificial entity in the Balkans and on the Adriatic. Knowing that, the occupiers and enemies, often aided by powerful foreign supporters, but also by the traitorous part of the Croatian opposition, through their own or the "Croatian press," are feverishly assailing the institutions of Croatian administration or power in order to thus weaken the Croatian state. At the same time, they are trying not only to minimize their crimes, but also to cover them up and conceal them by destroying evidence, as Elisabeth Rehn, the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights, says; in other words, they are cleaning up and painting their concentration camps where thousands of Croats and Muslims perished, and are trying to eliminate all

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traces of mass graves. It is clear to Ms. Rehn that IFOR [Implementation Force] sentries should be deployed to these crime scenes, but unfortunately that is not possible, because it costs too much; in other words, the magnificent "international community" does not have enough money! Thus, the Serbs continue to destroy evidence, move into Croatian Podunavlje, accuse Croats of crimes, which the world is happy to accept at face value, because in that way the "international community" can justify its own unclear conscience, its cold-blooded contemplation of the massacres at Vukovar, Srebrenica, and elsewhere, when they behaved like spectators at a soccer match. What is more, Ms. Rehn also says this: "It must be made clear to the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims that they will receive money from the international community for rebuilding only if they support the Hague Tribunal and the campaign for human rights." In other words, turn over to us those people who have been identified to us as war criminals (naturally with no mention that they were simply defending their homeland) and we will reward you with hard currency. Or agree to everything that Mr. Koschnik is doing, betray Croatia, betray yourselves, and you will be awash in milk and honey! Everyone who says such things, who gives us such advice, while holding a sword of Damocles over Croatia, is forgetting the adage from the prince's palace in Dubrovnik: *Non bene pro toto libertas venditur auro*—Do not sell freedom for any amount of gold!

Croatia: Tudjman, Ex-HDZ Members Reach Rapprochement

LD1104224396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 11 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Surprising news from neighboring Croatia—there has been a political rapprochement between President Tudjman and Stipe Mesic and Josip Manolic, former members of the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] who set up the Croatian Independent Democrats Party on 20 April 1994. We have a report on this news of the day in Zagreb. Mesic and Manolic are confident that Tudjman has given up on the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was the main reason for the split. Nada al-Issa reports for our chronicle through BH PRESS service:

[al-Issa] Stipe Mesic and Josip Manolic believe that President Tudjman has fully accepted the idea of an undivided Bosnia-Herzegovina and the implementation of the Washington and Dayton Agreements, which brought about their rapprochement.

After his first meeting with President Tudjman in the presidential palace, Manolic is confident that Tudjman is resolved to get rid of all radicals, which is to say extremists, in both Croatia and so-called Bosnia-Herzegovina. This will contribute to the establishment of the Federation and the preservation of a united Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The split between Tudjman on the one hand, and Mesic and Manolic on the other, occurred in 1994 and was caused by the policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina. But now Tudjman's views on Bosnia-Herzegovina are similar to those of Mesic and Manolic—this is at least what they say.

Bosnia-Herzegovina contributed to their rapprochement now just as it contributed to the split at the time.

Croatia: Italian Union, NOVI LIST Fined for Customs Offenses

AU1204072196 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 9 Apr 96 p 4

[Article by B.P.: "Italian Union and NOVI LIST Fined"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It seems that Rijeka cannot live without scandals, and now there is a new one on the horizon. On one side there are the Rijeka Customs Office and the Financial Auditing Office for Primorsko-Goranska County, and on the other side there are the Italian Union in Rijeka and the Rijeka daily NOVI LIST. The scandal seems to involve the import and usage of printing equipment and spare parts.

According to the ruling of the Customs Offenses Committee of the Rijeka Customs Office, the Italian Union of Rijeka is fined 19,550,294.24 kuna for a customs offense—subleasing to another person equipment and property which have been imported based upon tariff concession; the equipment was allegedly given to NOVI LIST. For accepting those subleased goods (printing machines and equipment), NOVI LIST has been fined 9,315,332.80 kuna. Both fines are not yet final.

Furthermore, according to the investigation of the Rijeka station of the Primorsko-Goranska County Financial Auditing Office, the Rijeka NOVI LIST Inc. is charged with evasion of the turnover tax on goods for the period 1992 to 1995, and must pay interest and penalties amounting to 4,434,626.36 kuna on that tax.

Krunoslav Grguljan, the chairman of the Customs Offenses Committee of the Rijeka Customs Office, has said that he has "nothing else to add to what had been written in the ruling of the Customs Offenses Committee of the Rijeka Customs Office. After many months of work on establishing facts, we have made the ruling with fines and explanations. The fined legal and responsible persons have the right to appeal to the Committee for Offenses of the Customs Administration of the Republic

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of Croatia in Zagreb, within eight days from the day of receiving the ruling."

The leaders of the Italian Union [TU] of Rijeka, Giuseppe Rola, president of the TU Assembly, Maurizio Tremul, president of the TU Executive Board, and Silvano Zilli, member of the TU Executive Board, have announced their appeal of the ruling of the Customs Offenses Committee of the Rijeka Customs Office.

The Rijeka NOVI LIST Inc. will defend itself within the legal term against the charges of the Financial Auditing Office and the rulings of the Rijeka Customs Office, by using all its rights. This was stated in the information issued by the Administration and the Supervisory Board of the Rijeka NOVI LIST Inc., signed by the manager of the company Zdenko Mance, and Ivo Kirigin, chairman of the Supervisory Board.

[Box, p 4]

Attack With an Aim To Establish a New Paper

"The proof that the public area in Croatia is growing smaller and that we are moving from a little bit of democracy toward a lot of autocracy is the most recent case of NOVI LIST, which has been attacked in an organized way in order to be weakened financially so that there is space created for a new Rijeka paper owned by the ruling party." This was stated yesterday at the IDS [Istrian Democratic Congress] news conference at which MP Dr. Axel Luttenberger and the president of the Rijeka branch of IDS, Petar Turcinovic, were present. IDS supports all those who have been trying to maintain this paper independent from the policy of the ruling party.

Turcinovic called the changes in the penal legislation undemocratic and very restrictive, and he also appraised that those penal laws were supporting media censorship, the self-censorship of journalists, and the muzzling of freedoms. The IDS thinks that in Croatia no person should be more protected than any other, which has been the situation up to now.

The IDS supports the parties which participate in the executive power in Primorsko-Goranska County in disobedience to the county ruler Josip Roje, and Luttenberger has invited the State Auditing Office and the Financial Auditing Office to inspect how the county ruler has been spending taxpayers' money.

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FYROM: Opposition Reacts to Agreement With FRY

AU1104183296 Skopje MIC in English 11 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Reactions to FRY, FYROM [Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] Recognition:

The Liberal Party notes that a change has been made in the text of the agreement on normalization of the relations with FRY. According to the vice-president of this party Risto Ivanov, the last stance from Article Four of the agreement has been changed, which opens new moments in the regulation of the question of succession to the former SFRY.

VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] This party feels that in the future negotiations, the borders, which have yet to be determined between Macedonia and FRY, will be at Macedonia's disadvantage. The leader, Ljupco Georgievski stated that "it took us one year to get the same thing we could have signed even back then." In his opinion, the question of the border between FRY and Macedonia remains an open problem.

PDPA (Party for Democratic Prosperity of the Albanians in Macedonia): This party made a negative assessment of the recently signed agreement between FYROM and FRY on the normalization of relations between the two countries. "It should be said out in the open," the party says in its announcement, "that this agreement protects only the Macedonian and Serbian interests, while the interests of the Albanians are ignored with unimaginable arrogance."

The announcement also says that the secret diplomacy the two sides are involved in actually guarantees a continuation of the secret talks between these two neighboring countries, even when the Yugoslav National Army was withdrawing from Macedonia. In addition, the announcement says, by completely ignoring the Albanian political subject participating in the Government signing the agreement, where Kosovo is treated as an integral part of Serbia, this clashes not only with the aspirations of the Kosovo Albanians for independence, but also the support of the Albanians in Macedonia expressed at the referendum for the independence of Kosovo.

Democratic Party of Serbs [DPS] is pleased with the signing of the Agreement on normalization of relations between FRY and RM [Republic of Macedonia]. Firstly, because the Agreement takes into account the position of the Serbs in Macedonia. DPS wants the Serbs to be included in the Macedonian Constitution and feels that "by signing this agreement, there will be true security in the Balkans."

FYROM: Albanian PPD Head: FRY Accord 'Unacceptable'

AU1104200396 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 11 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The agreement between Belgrade and Skopje has been at the focus of the Balkan and European media. Citing the first assessments and reactions on the agreement, the news agencies also carried the statement by Abdurrahman Haliti, chairman of the Party for Democratic Prosperity [PDP; PPD in Albanian].

Haliti declared that any act that contributes toward preserving peace and stability in the region should in principle be hailed. However, this does not hold true for this agreement, since it harms the interests of others, above all Albanians. Mr. Halili stressed that the agreement is also against peace, as it recognizes Serbia's state continuity as it existed before the setting up of the constitution of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, and this in fact includes the Bucharest agreement, according to which the territory of present-day Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] was part of Serbia.

PPD Chairman Haliti further stressed that this mutual recognition does not respect the political will of Albanians in any of its segments, and as such, it is unacceptable.

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Poland: Article Views U.S. Interest in Poland

WS1204110796 Poznan WPROST in Polish 14 Apr 96 pp 20-21

[Article by Stanislaw Janecki in Washington: "Washington Behind Closed Doors"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *When Robert A. Manning, the most seasoned analyst from the Progressive Policy Institute in Washington, wondered how many congressmen exhibited at least a slight interest in Poland, he counted no more than eight. The reality is even more dour: A mere four members of the House of Representatives picked up their copies of a recent report published by the institute. Poland and the problems of Central Europe were not mentioned in the course of the most recent U.S. primary elections.*

During a visit to Chicago, Robert Dole did not even try to romance the Polish electorate. For Pat Buchanan, far more important than the problems of Poland and Central Europe was proving the patriotism of General Custer, the infamous slaughterer of Indians. As the Republican presidential candidates campaigned for votes, two candidates to the Congress who always stressed their Polish extraction—Nancy Kaszak and Bob Kustra—spectacularly flopped. The Poles, the largest ethnic minority in Chicago, are losing on every front, not only with the Irish anymore, but also with Mexicans and even immigrants from the former Yugoslavia. To top it all, in the recent primaries, Edward Moskal, head of the U.S. Polonia Congress, supported not one of his own but a candidate from the former Yugoslavia.

Poland has always overestimated the role of the Polish lobby. For years it was believed that Congressman Dan Rostenkowski, an influential member of the Budget Committee [as published], was a very important figure. In reality, this politician looked after the interests of the Irish. He made his way into Congress thanks to the support of Mayor Daley, whose son has lately "succeeded him on the throne" as Chicago mayor.

Zbigniew Brzezinski has practically no influence on Bill Clinton's administration. When he visited Poland as the so-called Oleksy case was unfolding, it was speculated that he would give Aleksander Kwasniewski, the president-elect at the time, conditions, the fulfillment of which was to guarantee that the whole affair would not have a strong negative influence on Polish interests in the United States.

Asked about Brzezinski's mission, high-ranking officials of the National Security Council and the Department of State expressed surprise. They said it was the private initiative of a respected political analyst, who thus wanted to make a comeback on the political scene. In any case, the U.S. Administration did not authorize him to take any action. Daniel Fried, a former employee of the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw currently working way down on the ladder at the Department of State, thus continues to be the best-informed person on Polish affairs. The most recent visit paid by [Interior Minister] Siemiatkowski marked a new phase in Polish-U.S. relations. The cosignatory of the agreement on cooperation in combating drug smuggling was the third or fourth assistant to the attorney general.

Everyone at the State Security Council agrees that Poland is no longer "in the limelight." The bottom line is that, at the moment, Poland's membership in NATO is not an issue, "primarily because U.S. society truly believes the Cold War is over. Moreover, considering that Russia is no longer an enemy of the United States, Poland is in no danger," explains a high-ranking official of the National Security Council. The U.S. taxpayer is scared out of his wits that the enlargement of NATO might cost him more billions of dollars. After all, for the past few months major U.S. papers have been thundering about "the downsizing of America" [preceding phrase published in English], a euphemism for deep crisis.

No one has presented any official estimates of the possible costs of Poland's admission to NATO. Still, in the Congress one can hear the opinion that this cost will most certainly not be less than $8 or $10 billion. "Politicians are afraid; they do not want their hastily voiced support for Poland's aspirations to be interpreted as reckless squandering of the taxpayers' money, especially in a situation where it is impossible to achieve many domestic policy goals," says Steven J. Nider, a Washington expert on the affairs of our part of Europe. Nider notes that in many cases Poles have themselves to blame. First, in public statements in the United States, they only submit demands and make claims. Second, they are unable to show a constructive plan to take measures that would persuade NATO member states that they have achieved political and military maturity. Recently, Poles have refused to admit that it would be better for all parties if the hastily prepared Partnership for Peace died a natural death. The signals were unambiguous, although they were sent by political scientists, not by members of the administration. Warsaw's representatives pretended that they did not understand what the message was.

Aside from that, Bill Clinton attaches the greatest importance to the economic benefits he might reap by supporting the countries of our region. Thus, when he recently met with Boris Yeltsin during the antiterrorism summit in Cairo, he made it clear what America's support for Yeltsin depended on: Russia should agree to

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the delivery of U.S. chickens but not mention Moscow's taking a less adamant stand on NATO expansion. This proves the strength of chicken breeders and the evident weakness of the Polish lobby.

Over 90 percent of Americans do not even remember Kosciuszko and Pulaski, Polish-American national heroes.

Incidentally, the parade on Pulaski Day (which is a holiday) in Chicago was eliminated by the Poles themselves last year.

Many Polish politicians do not even try to develop contacts at the Capitol when they come to Washington. They settle for meetings with Polonia communities. If they do manage to hold talks with an important figure, they present a picture of Poland that resembles our country as it looked in the 1980's. Lyn Nofziger, a close friend of Bob Dole and Pat Buchanan, as well as the person who considerably helped Ronald Reagan win the election, is amazed by the black colors in which Polish opposition politicians depict their country. "I do not understand this schadenfreude. One can present political ideas of one's opponents in black colors, but stabilization and economic successes should be stressed abroad, regardless of political affiliations. How else can Americans be encouraged to make investments?" Nofziger wonders.

Thus, no one is saying that Poland's integration with the EU is impossible. However, our aspirations to join NATO must be put off for the time being. "Let us imagine a situation where all of the political and economic conditions of membership are met. In such a situation, the U.S. President is obliged to ask the military its opinion. The generals would most probably say 'no' because they would not feel like sharing military secrets with people whom they do not fully trust," says a high-ranking representative of the National Security Council. Discussions on NATO expansion will begin only when a real danger looms over Poland. Neither Zyuganov's nor Zhirinovskiy's victory in the June presidential elections in Russia is seen as such a danger in the United States.

Poland: Foreign Minister Interviewed on Joining EU

WS1204061096 Poznan WPROST in Polish 14 Apr 96 pp 17-18

[Interview with Polish Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati by Jacek Palasinski in Turin; date not given: "An Exam on Europe"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Palasinski] The EU is not unanimous on the issue of expanding to include the states of East Europe. Could you specify the countries that are least and most supportive of our membership?

[Rosati] I do not think that is a correctly phrased question. All of the EU states are for enlargement. Of course, there are differences of opinion on the details—for example, on which country is to be accepted when or on the decisionmaking procedures—but I do not believe it is possible to state at this point that there is a rift between the member states. Generally speaking, our biggest and most zealous supporters are Germany and France. These are the states we will count on most in the future. It would be unfair to say that the remaining states do not support us, but it is natural that they have a different standpoint, due to, for example, the costs and difficulties enlargement entails.

[Palasinski] The criteria of accepting new members stipulated in the white book are not fully congruent with the Polish economic policy outlined by Grzegorz Kolodko [deputy prime minister and minister of finance]. How do you manage to make the two—often different—options meet at Cabinet sessions?

[Rosati] That is not entirely true. [Deputy] Prime Minister Kolodko does try to adapt the Polish economic policy to meet EU requirements, especially the standards set in Maastricht.

[Palasinski] But not the anti-inflation policy...

[Rosati] Inflation is a real problem, but we are coping with it.

[Palasinski] What about the debt, the ratio between the GDP and the deficit?

[Rosati] The ratio between the debt and the GDP, as well as the ratio between the deficit and the GDP, have met the harsh criteria of Maastricht. The problem of steep inflation still remains to be solved, but no one is claiming we should enter the EU or the monetary union overnight. We still have several years to improve our macroeconomic performance.

[Palasinski] You are an optimist. When will we meet all the criteria?

[Rosati] I am a cautious optimist because there is still no general consensus on our joining the EU. We will have to make a number of unpopular decisions—for example, cut subsidies to compensate for the budget deficit and reform the social security system. These are not popular projects. If, however, we succeed in bringing inflation below 10 percent and manage our finances well over the next three or four years, Poland will be able to join the EU without any problems, especially because our achievements in other areas are impressive: Economic

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growth is very dynamic, exports and investments are on the rise.

[Palasinski] At the same time, however, we are receiving signals that not all is well in the economy. All the hitches are immediately picked up by Brussels and the IMF. In short, we are not liberal enough.

[Rosati] That is right. You have to be very cautious and leave no room for concessions. An understanding of financial systems is still lacking, especially in parliament. All of the political groups have to understand the principles of a sound economy and basic economic terms if they are to speak one language. If we want to join the European family of nations and have a smoothly running economy that would allow investment to be stepped up and more jobs created, if we want guarantees of a secure future, we must make an effort to understand these things.

[Palasinski] What postulates is Poland currently presenting to the EU?

[Rosati] First of all, we want the EU to be more specific and give a closer date of accepting the first states of East and Central Europe as members.

[Palasinski] Yet this is impossible before the end of the intergovernmental summit.

[Rosati] I regret this greatly. It would make it much easier for us to plan our activities. We do hope, however, that specific talks on EU enlargement will be launched several months after the conference. According to our estimates, the time horizon of those negotiations is two or two and a half years.

[Palasinski] Do you think Polish diplomats have done everything possible after 1990 to take full advantage of our "five minutes in the spotlight"? Our membership in NATO seemed very real at the summit in November 1991.

[Rosati] I do not want to evaluate my predecessors. Perhaps some things might have been done better; we could have been more active in certain areas. I do not think, however, that it was possible to join NATO quickly. Besides, NATO was not ready for that. We will now try to implement a very extensive policy: Our membership in NATO, it turns out, depends not only on member states, but also on our relations with Russia and other eastern neighbors. We will not ask for anyone's approval. The West, however, is closely watching whether we are capable of developing proper relations with Russia. Western states do not want to accept a country that has inimical relations with the superpower that Russia is.

[Palasinski] Has Polish foreign policy not been excessively focused on Germany, at the expense of "back-bench" states such as Spain and Italy? We have not had an ambassador in Rome for over a year now.

[Rosati] Opinions vary on which are the most important states. Germany is our biggest economic and political partner. It is most supportive of our pro-European aspirations. Besides, we have very good relations with France. We are trying to build a new structure together.

[Palasinski] Are you talking about the so-called Weimar Triangle?

[Rosati] Exactly. The Weimar Triangle may be an axis of stability in Europe. That is why we have very high expectations of the initiative. We must definitely liven up our dialogue with the Mediterranean countries, and also with Ireland and the Scandinavian states. We want them to support our membership in the EU; we would like to convince them that our membership does not threaten their interests but, on the contrary, might be profitable. As for our ambassador in Rome, we have to change the situation as soon as possible. I think a new ambassador will be appointed over the next two or three months.

[Palasinski] Talking to Jacques Santer and Klaus Haensch, I heard that Poland is halfway ready to join the EU. What must we do to move further along?

[Rosati] First, we must be consistent in implementing the "acquis communautaire" [as published] provided for in the white book. We already have a plan of action. We have to accelerate legislative procedures so that we can adopt the package of EU regulations. Anther major issue is restructuring the farming sector...

[Palasinski] Which hardly seems possible given the firm stance of the Polish Peasant Party.

[Rosati] It is a very difficult process that will have a huge impact on society. The earlier we launch it, however, the less painful it will be. We must finally take action because not much has been done in this area to date. The same applies to coal mining, heavy industry, and the arms industry. Difficult decisions will have to made in all these fields.

[Palasinski] We also need a lot of capital, especially foreign.

[Rosati] Without foreign capital, the adaptation process would be far more difficult and pose greater social threats.

[Palasinski] From the point of view of the West, however, one might get the impression that Poland is ever less eager to attract foreign capital.

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[Rosati] That is not true. The government I have had the honor of being part of for the past three months is a staunch supporter of foreign capital and is doing everything to attract it. We have recently amended the laws on joint ventures and on selling land to foreigners. This will encourage the inflow of capital. I believe the process will develop, and we do not have many grounds to be fearful. The constantly changing legal regulations and recurrent political instability are a major problem. But it is temporary.

[Palasinski] There is also the weakness of the banking sector.

[Rosati] Yes, this is a weakness of all of the states undergoing a systemic transition. Yet we are very advanced in restructuring the banking sector, and positive results will soon be visible.

Poland: Politicians Comment on Kwasniewski's Moscow Talks

WS1204062396 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 11 Apr 96 pp 1, 6

[Article by "DZ" and "DP": "Opinions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "It was a successful visit, not only as regards Polish-Russian relations but also from the point of view of the third partner—the West," Professor Adam Bromke said when TRYBUNA asked him his opinion of President Kwasniewski's talks in Moscow. "Our chief principle in dealing with Russia must be the following: We should not 'step out of line' as far as the West's policies are concerned; this gives us strength and makes integration with NATO possible. This visit reinforced our favorable image in the West because Aleksander Kwasniewski firmly stressed our unchanging desire to join NATO, and, at the same time, he did this calmly, in dialogue, so as to avoid a conflict. He presented Poland as a country that is not in conflict with Russia, a country that is prepared for reasonable dialogue. However, he stood firm. He also presented the entire problem in the broader framework of European security. It seems to me that he very skillfully endorsed Yeltsin's candidacy in the forthcoming elections, which will be favorably received by Kohl and Clinton."

Professor Longin Pastusiak, deputy chairman of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Commission, said the following: "I am not surprised that the differences of opinions on NATO expansion were not resolved. We certainly could have expected that the presidents would sign more agreements, which, in turn, means that we still have a few issues on which we need to come to an understanding. I am now refering to ship traffic on the Pilava Strait, fishing on the Okhotsk Sea, agreements on visa-free traffic and on readmission, as well as retrieval of objects that constitute Poland's cultural heritage."

In the opinion of Professor Wojciech Lamentowicz, minister of state in the President's Chancellery, the visit crowns the efforts both countries had been making. Incidentally, Poland and Russia have considerably improved their relations over the past few months. Even the preparations for the visit were remarkable—they were based on consultations with both the opposition in the country and presidents of other countries. Foreign affairs on the presidential level have not so far been handled in such an open style, involving partnership.

TRYBUNA also asked representatives of the opposition for their opinion. According to Janusz Korwin-Mikke, chairman of the Union for Real Politics, if not even one treaty or agreement was signed, we can say that the visit was not paid at all. He believes that it was an affront that President Kwasniewski "did not meet with Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, potential winner of the presidential elections in Russia."

Surprising assessments were voiced by Leszek Moczulski, chairman of the Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN], who simply did not like anything about this visit. "As a result of the way in which the Moscow trip began, the entire visit became slightly ambiguous. The exclusion of Katyn [forest where thousands of Polish officers were killed by the Soviets in World War II] from the official protocol created a negative impression not only in Russia, but also among diplomats of other countries." Does this mean that Leszek Moczulski has everyday working contacts with the offices of the most important world politicians? According to the KPN chairman, "It is outrageous that the issue of Poland's integration with NATO was a subject of Polish-Russian negotiations. It is all the more surprising because, by joining NATO, Poland wants to protect itself from possible attack by Russian imperialism."

The fact that TRYBUNA has asked Mr. Moczulski and Mr. Korwin-Mikke their opinions is not the only reason we have included these statements in the report. We simply believe that our readers should know those opinions so that they may draw conclusions on the way of thinking of some representatives of the opposition.

Poland: Russian Compensation for Poles Exiled to Siberia

LD1204090896 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 0800 GMT 12 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Speaking on Polish radio, Foreign Affairs Minister Dariusz Rosati said that, during the Polish presidential delegation's Moscow visit, the issue

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of compensation payments to Poles exiled to Siberia [in 1939-45] had been raised.

The foreign affairs minister said that President Boris Yeltsin had begun consultations with his advisers on this issue. Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Yevgeniy Primakov also promised that he would tackle the issue.

Referring to the planned agreement between Poland and Russia on visa-free travel, Minister Rosati said that it would only be signed if Russia agreed to sign an agreement on the return of illegal entrants [from Russia] expelled from Polish territory.

Poland: Contradictory Reports on Oleksy Case Proceedings

WS1204103796 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 12 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by "KNYSZ": "UOP Denies, Czempinski Confirms"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Office of State Protection [UOP] yesterday denied that operations in the Oleksy case had been suspended, as stated by the former chief of the Office, General Gromoslaw Czempinski. Czempinski reported the suspension in an interview given to Monika Olejnik of the [regional] Warsaw Television Center. He said the decision had been made after Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz accepted his resignation on 28 February. The former UOP head claimed that proceedings had been discontinued because of an "eastward operational risk."

We were informed by the UOP Press Office yesterday that operations in the Oleksy case are in progress. On the other hand, Interior Minister Zbigniew Siemiatkowski told the Third Program of the Polish Radio that he did not know whether there were such operations: "I stay far away from the Oleksy case." He emphasized that he had no influence on intelligence and counterintelligence activities. However, Gen. Czempinski confirmed his statement. He informed the Third Program of the Polish Radio yesterday that "some proceedings have been suspended. Both the Office and I know about this."

Poland: Conflict Between Solidarity, ROP Leaders Reported

WS1204061996 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 11 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by Pawel Reszka and Marcin Dominik Zdort: "ROP Spokesman: Marian Krzaklewski Is Acting Like an Old Dawdling Woman; A Conflict Between Solidarity and Olszewski's Party"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The agreement between the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland [ROP] and Solidarity has become uncertain. ROP Spokesman Jacek Kurski severely criticized Marian Krzaklewski. Kurski claims that the chairman of the trade union does not know anything about politics and that he is leading the Solidarity camp from one defeat to another. Krzaklewski terms Kurski's statement as crazy. He also demands explanations from Jan Olszewski.*

The dispute will probably be discussed by the National Commission, which is holding a meeting today in Lodz. The conflict broke out quite unexpectedly because, thus far, the official relations between ROP and Solidarity have been developing very well. The Solidarity chairman met with the ROP head on 18 March in Gdansk. Krzaklewski proposed forming the broadest possible bloc of the post-August [reference to August 1980, when Solidarity came into being] camp, whereas Olszewski proposed that the union and the party should jointly run in elections.

After the meeting, differences appeared. The ROP leader estimated that the chance to form a joint bloc of ROP and Solidarity, as well as its victory in the parliamentary elections, were "almost certain," the Polish Press Agency reported. Marian Krzaklewski stressed that Solidarity would like to form a broad bloc, and, if noncommunist parties do not reach an agreement, the trade union will run in the elections by itself.

The Attack by the ROP Spokesman

The open conflict was triggered by the statements Jacek Kurski made at a meeting with the residents of Bialystok in late March. The ROP spokesman criticized the Solidarity leader for not wanting to form an alliance exclusively with ROP and for his idea of building a broad electoral bloc that would also include the Freedom Union [UW].

The Bialystok KURIER PORANNY quoted Kurski's statements: "Krzaklewski belittles the success of ROP and Solidarity when he says that nothing has happened between us and that what we need is a broad coalition from UW to Walesa. Now, after all, UW is walking hand in hand with the communists. What Krzaklewski is saying is nothing more than gibberish, and for this reason it is necessary to ask the chairman whether he is a man and a leader or an old woman who is asking Walesa favors."

Another local daily, GAZETA WSPOLCZESNA, also quoted Kurski's remarks. Kurski reportedly said that Marian Krzaklewski is trying to "decrease the importance of the announcements" about the formation of an alliance between ROP and Solidarity in the parliamentary elections. "By doing this, Kwasniewski ignores the rank-and-file members of the trade union who want to

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be closer to ROP," Kurski said at one of his conferences.

Kurski Maintains What He Said

After returning from Bialystok, Kurski received a telephone call from Solidarity Spokesman Piotr Zak, who wanted explanations from him. Jacek Kurski maintained what he had said at the meeting. "I had to bring up this subject in Bialystok because there is some kind of 'pro-Krzaklewski' faction there, and for quite some time Bialystok Solidarity leader Jozef Modzelewski has been quietly acting against ROP," the ROP spokesman told RZECZPOSPOLITA.

Despite the growing conflict, Kurski does not intend to take back what he said. He does admit, however, that KURIER PORANNY did not carry the exact quotation: "I did not call Krzaklewski an 'old woman,' but an 'old dawdling woman,'" the ROP spokesman says, adding that "for four years now, Marian Krzaklewski, who does not know the first thing about politics but is able to exert influence on current politics as head of Solidarity, has been leading the post-Solidarity camp from one defeat to another."

According to the ROP spokesman, Marian Krzaklewski presents unrealistic ideas such as the Saint Catherine Covenant; he wants to deal the cards and put into effect his private aspirations. In this way, he is leading Poland to yet another defeat.

"Marian Krzaklewski's faction is suicidal because today there are only ROP and Solidarity on this side of the political scene. I am receiving many signals from Solidarity regional structures that support my statement," Jacek Kurski says.

Krzaklewski: That Is Crazy

"This is crazy behavior; I do not know where it stems from. I am not going to engage in a polemic with Jacek Kurski; I will discuss this with ROP Chairman Jan Olszewski," Marian Krzaklewski says. The Solidarity chairman claims that Jacek Kurski's statements pose a threat to the post-August camp: "I am sorry that this is happening, whereas the communists are rubbing their hands in glee."

Krzaklewski told us that he had sent a personal letter to the ROP chairman in which he demanded explanations. We found out unofficially that, in his letter, the Solidarity chairman demands that Olszewski publicly take a stand on the statements mad[illegible] the spokesman of his party.

"It was a private letter," Jan Olszewski told RZECZPOSPOLITA, refusing to answer when and how he would reply to the letter. The ROP chairman also refused to comment on Jacek Kurski's statements because, as he said, he did not know them in detail. "This is Mr. Kurski's business; as an activist he has the right to voice his opinions on his own responsibility. There is no reason to take official action against him," the former prime minister believes. Not unlike the ROP spokesman, Olszewski is not convinced that the idea of forming a broad Solidarity camp is good. "I believe this is a very risky idea," he says.

Poland: SdRP Prepares Ground for Elections

WS1204060096 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 1 Apr 96 p 4

[Article by Eliza Olczyk: "Taming the Electorate; the SdRP Steps Up Its Activities"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland [SdRP], the main pillar of support for the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], has already clearly started preparing for next year's parliamentary elections. The evidence has been borne out by the heightened activity of SdRP leader Jozef Oleksy. The chairman of the party often travels to regional party conventions and has met with potential SLD party members.*

Rebels and Loyalists

The SLD is a complex organism made of almost 30 organizations of varying importance and responsibility for government policies. It must take care to maintain a balance between voter demands and budget constraints.

Although SdRP members maintain tight control over the SLD, the fragile balance within the political club is shaken from time to time. The most rebellious parliament members are from the All-Polish Trade Union Agreement [OPZZ], whose representation in the SLD is second in number to that of the SdRP. Within the OPZZ itself, the strongest and most vocal group is made up of parliament members representing the Polish Teachers Union [ZNP]. There have been voices in the SdRP recently calling for a rethinking of the union's possible departure from the SLD. The union is displeased with the level of salary increases in the education sector, which it claims is far below government declarations.

The concern was raised at a meeting of chairmen of regional ZNP boards that the ridiculously low raises have forced the union to reconsider its continued membership in the SLD, which has demanded loyalty but offered very little in return. A motion was made to start immediate talks with other coalition members and present them with tough demands. Also discussed was the deference of ZNP deputies to government authorities. Thus, one

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of the political groups forming the SLD party conglomerate has positioned itself in opposition to the government (headed by a representative of the Alliance) and is clearly poised to fight for more money from the budget. Union leaders are surely well aware that, by leaving the SLD, their union would be deprived of parliamentary representation in the next session, thus relinquishing direct influence on the decisionmaking process on education issues. One can therefore presume that these calls from the ZNP are intended only to pressure the government more effectively and to prove to its members that the ZNP's role in the cogoverning party is not merely that of a noncritical supporter of party policies.

Not long ago, a conflict had to be averted in the SLD between the OPZZ and the SdRP, the cornerstone of the Alliance. The leader of the union accused SdRP and SLD leaders of such practices as not consulting the union on political decisions. The OPZZ threatened that only union instructions, rather than those of the entire SLD bloc, would be followed in parliamentary voting. In addition, demands were made to include OPZZ members in appointments. The conflict was warded off only after a cooperation agreement between the SdRP and the OPZZ was signed. The agreement confirmed that there would be coordinaton in coming parliamentary elections (though this part of the agreement raised controversy within OPZZ ranks, where opinions were heard that it was too early to speak of the campaign.)

A Singular Sign of Peace

Despite these problems, the SLD is willing to absorb new organizations.

Quite recently, SdRP Chairman Jozef Oleksy had talks with PPS [Polish Socialist Party] leader Piotr Ikonowicz. (PPS deputies currently remain outside the SLD since breaking voting discipline on an important vote.) After the meeting, Oleksy did not rule out possible cooperation between the parties in next year's parliamentary elections. SdRP leaders supported PPS attempts to regain from the State Treasury at least a part of that party's assets assumed by the PZPR [the Polish United Workers Party, after the merger between the PPS and the PPR] in 1948. The PPS intends to officially address the issue to the government. It is highly possible, therefore, that the PPS will sign a coalition agreement and rejoin the SLD before the elections.

Kazimierz Morawski's Christian-Social Union [UChS] is another party with an appetite for its own parliamentary representation as part of the SLD. As has recently been revealed, the UChS discussed the issue with SLD leaders as early as last fall. This step is to be finalized within the next few days, with the UChS officially acceding to the SLD.

Jozef Oleksy has been persuading local party activists of the need to win over people associated with the Roman Catholic Church. In Oleksy's opinion, the recent presidential elections have shown that a part of the Catholic electorate has already cast a vote for the social democrats by voting for Aleksander Kwasniewski. Results in parliamentary elections, however, are not necessarily a reflection of results in presidential elections, especially in the second round, when the choice is between two candidates and their religious orientation is not always a primary issue. Yet the growing support for the SLD, evidenced in opinion polls, indicates that the social democrats' slogans incur favor with some Catholics. These voters, it seems, no longer need to be coerced. At the same time, the SLD stands little chance of winning over those politically orientated toward the right. It may be pondered whether Jozef Oleksy's exertions are aimed at getting the SLD's anticlerical electorate used to the idea that a compromise with Catholic Church officials is needed. It is no secret that Aleksander Kwasniewski is intent on having good relations with the Roman Catholic Church hierarchy. The price for this may be ratification of the Concordat in its present form. This issue will somehow have to be explained to those who voted for a left-wing candidate exactly because of the anticlerical stance of the Democratic Left Alliance. The need to rally the support of left-oriented Catholics could serve as an acceptable explanation. It would also fit in with Aleksander Kwasniewski's campaign platform of a "common Poland" for all.

There are many indications that the SLD also intends to absorb the Women's Parliamentary Group and thus approach the female electorate. The group has already been dominated for some time by SLD representatives. Malgorzata Winiarczyk-Kossakowska is a member of the SLD presidium for contacts with the Women's Parliamentary Group. Following her resignation from the post of chairperson of the group, Barbara Labuda was succeeded by Senator Dorota Kepka, linked to the SLD.

The last conference meeting of the group was dominated exclusively by ladies from the SLD club. Danuta Waniek, head of the Presidential Chancellery, encouraged participants in the conference to have women's organizations carry out Aleksander Kwasniewski's campaign slogan of "A common Poland." She also proposed that the ladies who had arrived for the conference organized by the Women's Parliamentary Group appeal to Catholic organizations to consider possible cooperation on such nondebatable issues as public safety, child nutrition programs, and profamily policies (although these profamily policies are one of the most disputed issues one can imagine).

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Minister Danuta Waniek also tried to persuade members of the meeting that it is already time to think of election programs, and the conference of the Women's Parliamentary Group may well have served that end.

The Program Has Become Obscure

Not all, however, share Minister Waniek's opinions. The Voivodship Council in Koszalin, for instance, expressed its concern at a recent meeting that the "party's program is becoming obscure." Not much of the SLD's 1993 election program has remained.

Despite clamorous declarations, the new constitution has not yet been drawn up, and it is unclear whether it will be ready before next year's elections. Although the program for the reform of the social insurance system has reached the Sejm, chances that the program will be implemented are virtually nil. This is equally true of the health insurance bill. Although the unemployment rate dropped in the SLD's first two years in power, it soared again this year, and there is no way of knowing how long this trend will continue. Inasmuch as this possibility was not taken into consideration and sums to be paid out to the unemployed will have to be retallied, the Labor Ministry's budget may collapse.

Though the inflation adjustment for retirement and disability pensions will be indexed at their 100-percent value as promised by the SLD in its election program, this will take place no earlier than...in six years time, and elections are just a year away. The program, announced in 1993, made no mention that it would take almost 10 years for the index value to approach the 100-percent mark. In the meantime, [Labor] Minister Leszek Miller forced the adoption of new rules for pension rates adjustments that are less favorable to old-age pensioners and the disabled than previous ones. The housing industry has plunged as under other governments. Reprivitization remains an unresolved problem, and questions of property rights have yet to be put in order. The progress of the privitization process is sluggish. Further, the introduction of legislation for advancing self-government has not gotten off the ground. If the concordat is signed in its present, unrevised shape, the SLD will truly have little to boast of in the coming elections. If so, one of its few successes will be the relaxation of antiabortion measures, if it is able to pass such legislation.

Thus, by all signs, the Alliance is slowly preparing itself for next year's parliamentary elections and receiving declarations from other political factions of a common front and joint list in the elections. It is also looking for new ideas for the election campaign. Its slogan in 1991 was "This cannot continue," modified in 1993 to "This does not have to continue." It will not be easy for the SLD to find a battle cry in the coming elections, in which it will fight to stay in power. The SLD's strength may be good logistics preparation for the elections and the ability to present itself to the electorate as an internally cohesive bloc that is also responsive to problems of various social groups. In contrast to the bickering and internally divided rightist political parties, the Alliance projects well. Of course, the fact that it has delivered few of its 1993 campaign promises remains a problem. One should keep in mind, however, that voters rarely read into party platform manifestos. The general message of campaign promises, that things will get better, not worse, is the usual residue of election campaigns. The holding up of the privatization process or social insurance reforms is, in the short run, beneficial to the lowest income groups. It gives them respite from perpetual reforms and the constant need to "economize." It also creates the impression that the situation has settled down and that the worst is finally over. With the right propaganda and an effective election campaign, this may be enough to win next year's elections.

Poland: Rise in Trade With Czech Republic Noted

96EP0042A Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 5 Mar 96 pp 9-10

[Interview with Ladislav Dvorak, first secretary for trade issues at the Embassy of the Czech Republic, by Ewa Ploplis; place and date not given: "Like Czech and Lech"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Ploplis] How has trade between the Czech Republic and Poland been evolving?

[Dvorak] Czech-Polish trade is growing. According to Czech statistics, in 1995 reciprocal trade amounted to $1.5674 billion and was 61.3 percent higher than in 1994. Czech exports to Poland last year were $292.2 million and increased by 68.7 percent compared with 1994. Imports were at the level of $638.2 million, or 51.6 percent more than in the preceding year. The 1995 balance of trade was positive to the Czech Republic, to the extent of $291 million.

It is worth noting that in 1990 the volume of our reciprocal trade was similar, on the order of $1.5 billion, but from then until 1993 it kept dropping to $700 million. The reasons for that situation were several: the switch to payments in dollars, the problems with economic transformation and privatization in both countries, and the more pro-Western economic policy of both countries. Since 1993 trade has been steadily rising.

Last year Poland was the sixth largest trading partner of the Czech Republic, behind such countries as the FRG, Slovakia, Austria, Russia, and Italy. Trade between

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Poland and the Czech Republic accounts for about 3.3 percent of Czech foreign trade volume. Poland even outranks France and Great Britain as our trading partner.

[Ploplis] What are the reasons for such substantial growth in trade between the two countries in recent years? And what are the prospects for its further increase?

[Dvorak] Here the CEFTA [Central European Free Trade Association] agreement and the restoration of normal trade relations are the principal factors. It should also be emphasized, however, that economic relations between our countries have always been good. In CEMA [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] times Poland ranked second or third (alternately with the GDR) among the partners in Czechoslovakia's CEMA trade.

As regards our common future, I am an optimist. In the future, trade between our countries will grow still more.

[Ploplis] What conditions need to be met for the growth of imports and exports in the not too distant future?

[Dvorak] Consider primarily payments. There is no joint bank for clearing mutual payments. At present our banks do that through middlemen from third countries. Payments in trade between our two countries are transmitted, e.g., via banks in London or Switzerland. Of course, these banks charge commissions. We would like to change this situation and create a joint bank or banks servicing trade-linked Polish-Czech payments. Preliminary talks are under way. These should be commercial banks.

An increase in reciprocal trade can also occur when payments are cleared in convertible national currencies, as for example between Poland and Belarus starting on 1 January 1996.

Also needed is greater cooperation between industrial plants and enterprises. At present two Czech assembly plants operate in Poland: Skoda Felicja in Antoninek near Poznan and the recently opened (last October) Moto-Zetor in Kalisz. We would also like to establish cooperation in truck manufacturing. These are the first swallows of industrial cooperation.

But what matters most is reducing duties and eliminating trade restrictions. For example, in two more years quotas will no longer be mandatory, whereas at present they affect trade greatly. But of course, closer cooperation between Polish and Czech plants and the introduction of direct payments are highly essential.

[Ploplis] What about the reciprocal customs policies of the two countries and the related prospects?

[Dvorak] As regards revising customs duties, we are bound to do so by CEFTA agreements and we are implementing this consistently and even accelerating the process of liberalization. Let me remind you that, pursuant to CEFTA, merchandise is classified into three groups: A, B, and C. Merchandise in groups A and B is already under zero duty rate in both countries, both in exports and in imports. A majority of industrial goods belong in these groups.

Group C contains the merchandise most protected by both markets and causing us the most problems in joint negotiations. Within that group, changes in duty rates are taking place regularly, until a zero duty rate is achieved in 1997. That group includes, e.g., metallurgical products, textiles, kitchenware, table ware, and china.

Then, also, there is the group of automotive products. Under the agreements we adopted, duty rates on these products will decrease by one-seventh each year until 2002, when they will be completely abolished.

Under the adopted timetable, duties on all industrial products will be completely abolished in 2002, and as early as 1997 they will be abolished on industrial products other than automotive ones and some metallurgical ones. This year there still remain 812 dutiable goods under the Polish import tariff and 839 under the Czech tariff.

[Ploplis] How do both countries protect their domestic markets? What products are concerned?

[Dvorak] Poland protects its market against Czech beer and motor vehicles. We, in our turn, protect ours against certain Polish farm commodities, e.g., last year, against sizable shipments of cabbage. We had to counteract that trend in order to protect our farmers.

[Ploplis] Have tendencies toward unhealthy competition in trade between both countries been observed? If yes, in what industries and concerning what products?

[Dvorak] There are no signs of unhealthy competition between Poland and the Czech Republic that might affect our mutual trade relations. On the other hand, there is the problem of the so-called gray zone in Polish-Czech trade, that is, of undocumented cross-border trade, the volume of which is substantial and which, it is worth noting, is based on complete interchangeability of the currencies of both countries and operates faultlessly.

[Ploplis] Are our economies compatible? If yes, in what fields?

[Dvorak] In some yes, in others no. For example, our furniture industries are mutually complementary,

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and in Poland they are more expanded than in the Czech Republic. In this case, the varieties manufactured complement each other. But this cannot be said of the machine tool industry, which is similar in both countries, so that here we have competition. Poland produces more woodworking machine tools.

[Ploplis] Could you identify the factors obstructing cooperation under CEFTA?

[Dvorak] I am gratified to note that there are no major obstacles to our reciprocal trade. To be sure, we would prefer it if Poland were not to protect its automotive industry, because we are a major car maker and Poland is to us a big potential market.

[Ploplis] Does the Czech Republic favor broadening CEFTA to include more countries, e.g., Lithuania?

[Dvorak] The Czech Republic supports extending CEFTA to more countries. The current prime minister is in favor of liberalizing foreign trade. This is particularly evident in bilateral trade talks. In addition to CEFTA, we have signed an agreement with Romania. Any time now we will sign an agreement with Bulgaria. We expect an agreement with Israel to take effect in mid-1996. Preliminary talks with Turkey and the Baltic countries—Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—also are in progress. We would like first of all for Romania, Bulgaria, and the Baltic countries, in that order, to join CEFTA.

[Ploplis] Will the integration and growing trade among the CEFTA countries help in their efforts to join the European Union and beef up their future standing in the Union?

[Dvorak] CEFTA is not only conducive to the growth of Polish-Czech trade. The tendency toward an increase in trade is observable among all the member countries of CEFTA. Integration within CEFTA neither promotes nor impedes directly the efforts of its members to join the European Union, but it does strengthen the economic position of the individual CEFTA countries, which may indirectly contribute to making these countries better partners of EU countries in the future. Admittedly, at present Poland may be a more advantageous partner to the European Union, because of its bigger market.

[Ploplis] Thank you for the interview.

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Romania: German Defense Minister Ruehe Arrives in Bucharest

AU1104104896 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1000 GMT 11 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] German Defense Minster Volker Ruehe arrived in Bucharest today at the head of a delegation upon an invitation extended to him by his Romanian counterpart, Gheorghe Tinca.

In the statement he made a short while ago at Otopeni Airport, the guest said he is very pleased with the intensive dialogue held with the Romanian side both in Germany and in Bucharest and mentioned that, during this visit, bilateral cooperation programs will be examined.

Mr. Ruehe mentioned the excellent cooperation within the Partnership for Peace exercises and said he will discuss most topical issues with the Romanian representatives in the Defense Ministry and Army, including international issues such as expansion of Euro-Atlantic security structures, the situation in central Europe and in the Balkans, and the role played by the two countries in their participation in IFOR [Implementation Force].

Romania: Chief of Staff, Hungarian Counterpart View Ties

AU1104150596 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1300 GMT 11 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] During a joint news conference held today in Bucharest by the chiefs of staff of the Romanian and Hungarian Armies, Army General Dumitru Cioflina and Lieutenant General Sandor Nemeth respectively, the two dignitaries said that the bilateral military relations continue to develop. Likewise, the sides mentioned that the plan for cooperation between the two armies has been updated. The two high military dignitaries emphasized that during the talks, they informed each other about the steps that they are currently taking for integration in Euro-Atlantic structures and mentioned that they will meet again in Brussels on 24 April at a NATO meeting to be held there.

We remind out listeners that General Sandor Nameth has been on a three-day visit to Romania. During his visit, Nemeth held talks also with the Romanian Defense Minster Gheorghe Tinca.

Romania: Senate Commission To Lift Tudor's Immunity

AU1004175296 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1600 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Judicial Commission of the Romanian Senate with nine votes in favor and one vote against has decided to lift the parliamentary immunity of Senator Corneliu Vadim Tudor.

According to the procedure, a report will be drafted and submitted to Parliament for approval. A two-thirds majority is needed to endorse this decision, our correspondent Dan Preda informed us.

Romania: UDMR's Marko Rules Out Alliances for Election

AU1004182096 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 4 Apr 96 p 6

["Exclusive" interview with UDMR leader Bela Marko by Doina Bostan; place and date not given: "I Do Not Accept Being Lumped With Adam Katona"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Bostan] You have often drawn attention to the danger of using nationalist rhetoric in the electoral campaign. Might you have been referring to the attacks of the PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party] or the PRM [Greater Romania Party]?

[Marko] Certainly, the parties that you have mentioned have an obvious anti-Hungarian program and the PUNR's attitude is well known. As regards nationalist rhetoric, the area for it could be much larger. In situations of crisis or when serious problems emerge in society, nationalism can be used as a means of diverting attention. By manipulating certain nationalist feelings, attention is diverted from real problems, that is, economic and social problems. The PUNR and the other parties that we consider extremist nationalist parties are interested in grabbing the attention of the public with anti-Hungarian propaganda and it is possible that the other parties might be pushed into a similar situation.

[Bostan] The opposition parties do not have governing errors to hide. Do you believe that your remarks are also valid for these parties?

[Marko] There is such a danger with these parties. In the case of us breaking with the CDR [Democratic Convention of Romania], one of the reasons was the CDR distancing itself from the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania]. Also for tactical considerations, they concluded that a pro-UDMR attitude would lose them part of their electorate. For the same reasons, the opposition might also start nationalist rhetoric.

[Bostan] Do you believe that nationalist voices might be raised within the Hungarian community? The Adam Katona case is well known....

[Marko] The moment it appeared, the UDMR suppressed the view that we considered that it fit into our program, while in Romania there are party presidents

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who are nationalists. Therefore, I do not accept that we can be lumped together.

[Bostan] Do you think of concluding any alliances or nonaggression pacts for the elections?

[Marko] We are not going to form any electoral alliances. We did not have any alliance for the general election in 1992, either. As for local elections, on a local level we will have electoral agreements.

[Bostan] What parties are you thinking of?

[Marko] We have excluded from the outset the PUNR, PRM, and PSM [Socialist Party of Labor]. With other parties we might support one another in the runoffs, depending on their programs. Nevertheless, I would make a distinction between the PDSR and the opposition parties that continue to be closer to us. However, we do not rule out agreements with the PDSR, either.

Romania: Gen Ciobota Takes Over as 10th Army Commander

AU1104124296 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 5 Apr 96 p 6

[Article by Daniel Capatos: "Brigade General Ghita Ciobota Has Replaced Brigade General Viorel Cheptine as Commander of the 10th Army Corps in Iasi"]

[FBIS Translated Text] By order of the minster of national defense, Brigade General Ghita Ciobota has been appointed commander of the 10th Army "Stefan cel Mare" in Iasi.

Ciobota replaces Brigade General Viorel Cheptine, who is currently employed at the General Staff of the Ground Troops, in this position. General Cheptine has been transferred to Bucharest following an investigation in connection with some serious violations of military rule. The transfer of the former commander of the 10th Army to Bucharest was necessary, because as long as he remained in Iasi, those who were asked to supply information in connection with the general's illegal activities refused to do so, being afraid to cooperate with the Ministry's Control Body.

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Federal

FRY: NATO, WEU To Lift Sea Blockade on 15 Jun

LD1104212696 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2107 GMT 11 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Rome, April 11 (TANJUG)—The joint NATO-WEU enforcement of the United Nations' maritime blockade of former Yugoslavia will be lifted on June 15, a NATO admiral said in Naples, Italy, on Thursday.

NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) mounted their joint operation on June 15, 1993.

Outgoing NATO naval commander Admiral Alejandro Reis Rodrigues of Portugal told a news briefing that the peace accord signed in Paris on Dec. 14, 1995, envisaged for a 180-day period for taking the decision to raise the maritime blockade.

The ships used in the operation will be anchored at Naples after the end of the operation, according to reports.

Rodrigues was speaking after a ceremony of handing over power at the helm of NATO's south wing naval force.

FRY: Government Determines Participation at Aid Conference

LD1104193596 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1845 GMT 11 Apr 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 11 (TANJUG)—The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) determined at its session Thursday [11 April] the basis for the participation of its delegation at the second conference of donors for the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be held in Brussels April 12 and 13.

The federal secretariat of information said the FRY delegation will express its readiness at the meeting to contribute 10 million US dollars to the program for the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The funds will in the first place be intended for the economic recovery of the Republika Srpska (RS), Serb entity in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The government has decided that the FRY delegation at the Brussels conference will be headed by Assistant Foreign Minister Nikola Cicanovic.

The government also took note of the report on the participation of the Yugoslav delegation at the ministerial meeting of the Contact Group in Moscow on March 23 and assessed that important progress was made at the gathering in overcoming certain problems of implementing the civilian component of the Bosnia peace accord.

The Moscow meeting has contributed significantly to the further realization of the peace process, the federal government said in conclusion.

FRY: Normalization With FYROM Seen as 'Fundamental'

LD1104210396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1829 GMT 11 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 11 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Government took the stand Thursday [11 April] that the full normalization of relations with the Republic of Macedonia was a fundamental factor of stability and the building of confidence among peoples and states in the Balkans.

The government discussed a report on the talks held between foreign ministers Milan Milutinovic of Yugoslavia and Ljubomir Frckovski of Macedonia in Belgrade Monday, a Federal Government statement said.

The Yugoslav Government said the establishment of relations with Macedonia was in keeping with Yugoslavia's policy of normalizing relations with the former Yugoslav republics.

It said it was very important that Macedonia had recognized the legal internationally continuity of Yugoslavia.

The government instructed competent federal ministries to take all necessary measures for Yugoslavia promptly to meet all obligations assumed under the agreement signed with the Republic of Macedonia, the statement said.

The Federal Government decided that Yugoslav citizens travelling to Macedonia to get their pensions be exempted from now on from paying a special tax when leaving the country once a month.

The government decided for the same to apply to the Yugoslav citizens working as migrant workers in neighbouring countries, the government statement said.

FRY: Belgrade To Demand Release of All POW's

LD1104211996 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1837 GMT 11 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Apr 11 (TANJUG)—The Secretary of Yugoslav Commission for Humanitarian Issues and Missing Persons Maksim Korac said Thursday [11 April] that Yugoslavia's delegation to the meeting with the corresponding Croatian commission would propose the signing of a

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protocol committing all sides to unconditional release of all prisoners of war.

In a statement to Radio Yugoslavia, Korac said that at the meeting scheduled for April 16, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would submit a list of 980 missing persons, Republika Srpska (R.S.) 12,000 and Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) several thousand.

Yugoslav commission for missing persons has been informed that about 60 Yugoslav nationals are being held in Croatian prisons.

According to information provided by R.S. and RSK commissions, 273 R.S. nationals and 488 RSK nationals are being held in prisons and camps in Croatia.

RSK was proclaimed by Serbs in their historical and ethnic areas of Croatia after the latter seceeded by force from the former Yugoslav federation in 1991.

Korac underlined that FRY does not hold any POWs, but Croatia, although well aware of this fact, still insists on the principle of reciprocity, disregarding both the Geneva Convention and the Dayton peace accord.

Croatia, Korac said, wishes to use the issue of missing persons for political purposes, as the first list of 32,000 missing persons submitted by Croatia was characterized by a series of irregularities. For instance, one person's name was listed 47 times, he said.

The second list, which was reduced to 12,000 names, included people killed in traffic accidents or dead long before the war. The list was modified several times and was finally reduced to 2,792 names, Korac said, noting that even that figure was not correct.

Yugoslavia has provided information on 217 persons through the Red Cross missing persons department, of whom 11 live in FRY and the rest in the Srem-Baranja region.

In November 1991, 30 persons from the Srem-Baranja town of Vukovar crossed into Croatia, for which written proof exists, and they cannot therefore be considered as missing persons. Death certificates for 76 persons buried in Vukovar were also provided, Korac said.

The Croatian list also includes the names of many Serbs from RSK who had been taken prisoner, killed or reported missing during Croatia's attacks on western Slavonia and Krajina in 1995. Information on their fate should be sought from Croatian Army and not from FRY, Korac said.

FRY: Milutinovic Meets With Canadian Foreign Minister

LD1104201796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1920 GMT 11 Apr 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Apr 11 (TANJUG)—Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy described as important the talk he held Thursday [11 April] in Belgrade with Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic.

Axworthy told the press the goal of his visit to the region was to monitor the implementation of the Dayton peace accord, as Canada has troops in IFOR [Implementation Force] and several humanitarian programs underway.

The minister said he wished to make sure that all efforts were being exerted to complete the peace process and establish lasting peace, so that people can take part in free and fair elections in Bosnia.

Axworthy spoke of Canadian financial programs now available to all states created in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, adding it had been agreed that groups of experts would start drawing up agreements on economic cooperation and air traffic.

Canada already recognizes Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as diplomatic relations have not been broken off, Axworthy said, noting that this was demonstrated by his own official visit to Belgrade.

The issue of raising the level of diplomatic representation will shortly be discussed by Canadian Government, Axworthy said. His visit to FRY ends on Thursday.

FRY: Yugoslav, Italian Trade Chambers To Cooperate

LD1104213096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1856 GMT 11 Apr 96

["Ecopool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 11 (TANJUG)—The Presidents of the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce and the Italian Union of Chambers, Mihailo Milojevic and Danilo Longhi, signed in Belgrade on Thursday [11 April] a agreement on inter-chamber cooperation.

By this act, the two sides wish to upgrade economic relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Italy and reestablish bonds between both countries' firms. Longhi said that Italy may soon become the first trading partner of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

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The Italian Union of Chambers will soon propose the reintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the Association of European Chambers which numbers 1,000 members, Longhi said, adding that his country would seek Yugoslavia's participation in the creation of a European register of firms.

Longhi invited Yugoslav firms to take part in a Euro-partnership meeting due to be held in Genova later this year. The meeting will be attended by representatives of 3,500 companies from all over Europe, he said, adding that he hoped Yugoslav businessmen would uphold an Italian initiative that Belgrade be chosen to host the next 1997 Euro-partnership meeting.

Milojevic said that there were very good prospects for establishing solid economic relations between the two countries and pointed out that Yugoslavia was ready for its return to the world market.

Speaking about Yugoslav legislation, particularly laws regulating foreign investments, Milojevic said that his country's legislation was for the most part adjusted to European Union (EU) standards.

Milojevic said that talks on the reintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the International Monetary fund (IMF) and other institutions were underway and that Italy could lend support to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in that field. During a talk with President of the Serbian Chamber of Commerce Vlajko Stojiljkovic, the Italian delegation pledged support to the reintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into international financial institutions.

Stojiljkovic recalled that before the introduction of the international community's sanctions against Yugoslavia, Italy was one of its leading trading partners and that bilateral cooperation, covered not only trade exchange but co-production, tourism and transportation.

The president of the Trieste Chamber of Commerce Alberto Donaggio said that Italy hoped that the EU would decide to give customs preferences to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia similarly to those granted to the former Yugoslavia.

Donaggio said that the Italian union would work to obtain credits for Yugoslav firms from Italian commercial banks.

He pointed out that the issue of transportation was still one of the crucial problems, and added that a resolution of the problem would contribute to the opening of Yugoslavia-Italy railway line via Croatia and Slovenia and that it was an essential element for restoring peace in the region.

Longhi said that both sides wished to establish close ties and that Serbia could secure it presence on the Western European market through Italy and that Italy for itself could secure its presence on markets in Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean and Central Asia through Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The Italian delegation expressed readiness to fully contribute to the reconstruction of Yugoslavia's economy, and both sides agreed that the railway and sea route Belgrade-Bar-Bari-Venice was the most suitable for transportation between the two countries.

FRY: Dispute Over SFRY Assets Abroad Reported

AU1104123496 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 11 Apr 96 p 7

[Unattributed report: "No Negotiating Gold or Hard Currency"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Upon his return from Paris from the (unsuccessful) negotiations with the IMF, Dr. Dragoslav Avramovic, governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia [NBJ], received a letter from Dr. Kosta Mihailovic, economic advisor to Slobodan Milosevic and chairman of the federal government's Group for Succession. According to the letter, which has been published by the Belgrade press, Mihailovic reminds Avramovic that he had ignored his warning, delivered in written form shortly before Avramovic left for Paris, that he was not to meddle with the distribution of hard currencies, gold, or any other assets of the former Yugoslavia, because the issue is within the jurisdiction of the government and its Group for Succession.

"Not only did you ignore the warning," the advisor reproaches the governor, "but you sent us a text on the same day, 27 April, in which you proposed distribution of the blocked hard currencies of NBJ abroad, the use of its gold for the establishment of a Balkan fund for stabilization and development, as well as a procedure for calling a meeting of the governors of the cer banks of all the former Yugoslav republics."

After that Mihailovic informed Avramovic that April, while he was in Paris, his model was discussed by the Group for succession, which decided that it was unacceptable. Drawing upon the conclusion of the federal government, the Group recalls that the goal is to unblock "our means" rather than to distribute the hard currency reserves of the former SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], because that is "an expensive, risky, and therefore unacceptable method." Besides, the distribution of the hard currency reserves is also unacceptable as a partial measure, in that it opposes the general agreement that the assets of the former

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SFRY be distributed as a "package" and by means of "the tactics used at the negotiations."

According to the Group, the use of the gold reserves of the state of Yugoslavia for the establishment of the Balkan fund would have some chance of eventual acceptance, but only after an agreement on the division of SFRY's assets is reached. "Besides," the Group claims, "in the current situation the idea is unacceptable to the interested parties, and legally inapplicable."

The federal government's Group for Succession strongly opposes any meeting of the governors of the central banks of the former Yugoslav republics, and any kind of interference by the governor and NBJ in its domain of jurisdiction.

Mihailovic even reminds Avramovic of the fact that Dr. Radoje Kontic, prime minister of the FRY Government, did not give him any authorization to call a meeting of his colleagues, the governors, on 11 and 12 April.

[Box, p 7]

On the same day he received Mihailovic's written warning, Avramovic informed FRY President Zoran Lilic, Serbian President Milosevic, Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic, Federal Prime Minister Kontic, and Federal Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic of this, and asked them whether the letter reflected their own attitudes. The NBJ governor warned these officials that state reserves had fallen to $310 million and are melting away at the rate of $1 million a day.

[Box, p 7]

NBJ governor Dragoslav Avramovic has announced that at the meeting of the NBJ Council scheduled for today he will report on "how far we have gone and what the perspectives are in the policies on hard currencies and credits, that is, whether the means abroad are available, and what the alternative is if we do not get those means," Avramovic said. "It is up to us whether we will obtain those means or not. That is perhaps the major misunderstanding between the government and myself. I hope we will resolve all these problems before the meeting of the parliament. If we fail to resolve them, and particularly if the attitude remains that we should freeze our relations with the world, which is an inevitable consequence of the government's stance, then we will present the matter to the parliament," Avramovic pointed out.

FRY: Bank Director: Reserves Dropping $1 Million Daily

AU1104131896 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 11 Apr 96 p 1

[Unattributed report: "$1 Million Less Each Day"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "There is a serious imbalance between the monetary mass and the foreign currency reserves, which are diminishing by $1 million daily. There is also a serious and pronounced deficit in the foreign trade balance," Ljubisa Igic, general director of Belgrade Bank and chief adviser to National Bank governor Avramovic, warned yesterday, in a press statement issued prior to the session of the Council of the National Bank of Yugoslavia today.

Emphasizing in the statement that "the foreign currency crisis is the key problem," Igic concludes that in light of the unsuccessful negotiations with the IMF "it is not consistent with all the political aspects of the continuity issue, however, that we advocate a definition of our status in the international financial organizations that would acknowledge the balance of powers among the former Yugoslav republics and in the offices of the international financial institutions." These formulations "should be accepted and not rejected." Second, Igic says, "I believe that we should advocate a definition of our status that would facilitate foreign currency financial support for Program 2, and not a solution that would cut us off from these funds."

We must maintain the stability of the money by pulling up on "the monetary reins" and creating a greater supply of accessible foreign currency: first with financial support from abroad (bond or credit capital, necessitating a normalization of relations with the international financial institutions, Igic specifies); by unfreezing our assets abroad; by exporting goods and services; and fourth, by returning foreign currency and nonbanking accounts into the regular banking flows, he says in the statement for the public.

FRY: Bank Head: Rejection of IMF Proposal 'Fatal'

AU1104135596 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 11 Apr 96 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Country's Foreign Currency Reserves Are Dramatically Diminishing"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—Dragoslav Avramovic, governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, recently sent two letters with alarming contents to the highest federal and republican leaderships and the Governors Council (scheduled to meet at

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1100 today), in which he informed them that the state of Yugoslav foreign currency reserves was alarming and that they were diminishing daily.

The governor, moreover, warned that the rejection of an agreement with the IMF would be fatal for Yugoslavia, because there is no fresh capital for reviving production, while foreign currency reserves amount to just over $300 million. The rejection of cooperation with the IMF, which would immediately secure fresh capital, could lead to a new hyperinflation, the governor concluded in his letters.

NASA BORBA exclusively cites the contents of the letters, as well as the "hot" correspondence between the governor and state authorities during the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia delegation's negotiations with IMF and World Bank representatives. We also bring you the proposal of the platform for negotiations on the division of frozen foreign currency and gold reserves which Governor Avramovic submitted (and the federal government rejected), as well as the response of Academician Kosta Mihajlovic in which he warns the governor "not to meddle in these affairs." The governor has confirmed for NASA BORBA the authenticity of all the documents.

"They will either give me free rein for negations with the IMF, or I will stop all loans," Avramovic told NASA BORBA, and added that at today's session, he expected to get the support of all Council members to stop all loans as of Monday [15 April].

The governor announced that if he fails to reach an agreement with the federal government, he would ask the FRY Assembly to support his platform. We have unofficially learned that Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic and Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic have given their full support to the governor's stances in negotiations with the IMF and have promised to support his efforts to secure victory for his option.

Serbia

Serbia: UNHCR Urges Release of 13 Srebrenica Detainees

AU1204100496 Paris AFP in English 0954 GMT 12 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 12 (AFP)—The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) said Friday [12 April] it had asked the Yugoslav government to immediately release 13 Bosnian Moslems being held in Serbia.

Belgrade has accused the 13 Moslems of war crimes, and barred them from joining 211 other Bosnian refugees who were repatriated to Bosnia on Wednesday.

A UNHCR plane was on standby at Belgrade airport awaiting the green light from the Yugoslav interior ministry to transfer the refugees to Bosnia.

They are part of a group of 796 Moslems who fled the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves in eastern Bosnia in July and August last year after it fell to the Bosnian Serbs.

All the refugees were held in two camps in Serbia, Sljivovica and Mitrovo Polje. They started leaving Serbia in waves as of last December.

There are 65 people still in the Sljivovica camp, 27 of whom were due to leave for Finland on Sunday, while the rest are still seeking host countries.

Serbia: Opposition Leader Against Recognition of FYROM

LD1104190196 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1556 GMT 11 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 11 Apr (SRNA)—Vojislav Seselj, chairman of the Serbian Radical Party, opposed today the recognition of Macedonia [Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] by the Belgrade authorities.

"The secession of Macedonia from Serbia is an unhealed wound on the heart of the Serbian people," Seselj said at a news conference in Belgrade.

He recalled that Radicals opposed the withdrawal of the Yugoslav People's Army from Macedonia in 1991, and said that those who made the decision on the withdrawal bore penal and legal responsibility before the whole of the Serbian people.

Explaining the Serbian Radical Party's views on the possible recognition of other republics of the former Yugoslavia, Seselj said that he had nothing against the recognition of Slovenia, if it recognized the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as the successor to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

"We are strongly opposed to the recognition of Croatia, as long as its troops do not withdraw from the territory of the Republic of Serb Krajina; we also oppose the recognition of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina as long as the Serb Republic is not recognized as an independent state," Seselj said. [passage omitted]

Serbia: Milosevic, Canadian Minister Discuss Ties

LD1104134196 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1234 GMT 11 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 11 Apr (SRNA)—President Slobodan Milosevic today received the Cana-

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dian Foreign Minister LLoyd Axworthy, who is in Yugoslavia on an official visit.

In a cordial talk, most attention was devoted to the development of bilateral relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] and Canada. It was said that our country and Canada are linked by traditionally friendly relations and diverse ties and cooperation between individuals and business partners. Both sides confirmed an interest in stepping up economic cooperation between our firms and Canadian firms.

It was said that Canada firmly supports the efforts to stabilize the political situation in the Balkans and especially the FRY's active and positive role. In this context, both sides expressed the belief that the FRY and Canada will continue to advance their bilateral relations.

Federal Foreign Affairs Minister Milan Milutinovic took part in the talks.

Montenegro

Montenegro: Podgorica Happy With Canada Stance on FRY

LD1104213796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1924 GMT 11 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Apr 11 (TANJUG)—Montenegrin Foreign Minister Janko Jeknic expressed Thursday [11 April] in Belgrade at a meeting with Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy his satisfaction with Canada's balanced and constructive stance towards the crisis in former Yugoslavia.

Jeknic also pointed to Montenegro's endeavors for the consistent implementation of the Dayton peace accord.

Both countries wish to promote bilateral cooperation in all fields, especially economy, it was noted at the meeting.

Jeknic pointed to Montenegro's wish to establish all forms of business cooperation with Canada, especially in the fields of industry, tourism, shipping, ecology, etc.

The two ministers welcomed the negotiations on investments underway between Canadian and Montenegrin companies.

Jeknic also informed Axworthy of Montenegro's foreign policy activities and of the importance it attaches to the development of relations with neighboring countries.

He also spoke of the situation at the Prevlaka peninsula in the Adriatic on and Montenegro's stance on resolving that dispute with Croatia.

Kosovo

Kosovo: Rugova Adviser on EU Report on FRY, FYROM

AU1104203796 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 11 Apr 96

[Telephone report by Shaban Arifaj in Pristina]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In a public communique on the agreement between Belgrade and Skopje, the European Union confirmed that it will welcome the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia in making further steps to completely normalize its relations with the international community. However, to recognize the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia, the EU has put forward some conditions, among which is the granting of extensive autonomy to Kosova within the framework of the remnant Yugoslavia.

Regarding this EU communique, Xhemal Mustafa, President Rugova's counselor for information affairs, told Albanian Radio and Television that the EU statement issued last evening presents another proof that the Belgrade regime cannot lay claims to a complete normalization of relations with West European countries without fulfilling some conditions that are still critical for this regime.

Among the conditions the EU has set on Belgrade remains the Kosova issue, which is already considered and treated as one of the most sensitive and complex questions and issues in southern Europe.

In this EU statement, the will of the people of Kosova for independence has not found the support it deserves. Yet, a lot remains to be done in this direction by Albanians and their leadership, as well as by the Western European governments. However, the position maintained by the countries of this union, as such, clearly testifies that the Kosova issue has found a broad audience in the international community and that, as a result, Kosova has never been and will never be Serbia's internal affair.

Mr. Mustafa further said that there are indications that, under the EU's great pressure, and especially from the United States, it is already clear to Belgrade that an equal and serious dialogue with the leadership of Kosova and under the mediation of a third party cannot be avoided. The will of the Kosovar people for independence is a determination and an incontestable and irrevocable will. The sooner that Belgrade accepts this fact, which Belgrade knows quite well but remains silent, the sooner and easier the Kosova issue will be resolved in a peaceful way and in a politically long-term settlement. In this direction, the Belgrade regime

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needs the assistance of the EU and the international community, Mr. Mustafa concluded. [passage omitted]

Kosovo: FRY-FYROM Agreement Seen as 'Concession'

AU1104204196 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 10 Apr 96

["Maintenance of 'Outer Wall' of Sanctions on Serbia Keeps the Peace Process on Track"—KOSOVA DAILY REPORT headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Setting Belgrade's normalization of relations with FYROM [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] as the sole and ultimate condition for EU's recognition of the Belgrade Government sounds here in Kosova as yet another concession to Milosevic.

The internationally-sponsored Dayton accords, reached in Dayton Ohio late last year, cited normalization of relations between the states emerging from the now defunct Yugoslav federation as a necessary step towards confidence-building and promotion of peace in this area. In this context, the mutual recognition between the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), which was announced Monday [8 April] in Belgrade, may be seen as one step in that direction, especially with regard to the Belgrade regime's notorious unwillingness so far to move towards recognizing the new realities in the region.

Rewarding Milosevic's regime by granting recognition to the Serb-dominated "Yugoslavia" now, when outstanding issues in the former Yugoslavia, especially Kosova, remain unsolved, may greatly diminish the chances of ensuring a comprehensive and peaceful settlement to the crises in the former Yugoslavia.

The Dayton accords had set a number of conditions to be met before Belgrade would expect re-integration in the international community. "An 'outer wall' of sanctions will remain in place until Serbia addresses a number of other areas of concern, including Kosovo and cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal," a State Department summary of the Dayton accords, issued in November 1995, said.

The "outer wall" of sanctions on Serbia has been seen as a last leverage in the hands of the international community to make Serbia comply with international norms. The phrase, cited frequently by senior American and European officials, has come to mean the impossibility for Serbia and its satellite Montenegro to fully integrate in the international political and financial organizations (UN, OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], International Monetary Fund, World Bank, amongst others) until several issues, including Kosova, are addressed. Making Belgrade's recognition of FYROM as the sole and ultimate condition for EU's recognition of the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia has been seen here in Kosova as yet another concession to Milosevic's government.

President of the Republic of Kosova Dr. Ibrahim Rugova had warned the EU late in January this year a premature normalization of relations with Serbia and Montenegro would have detrimental effects for the ongoing peace process in the former Yugoslavia.

Dr. Ibrahim Rugova said then in a letter to the Italian foreign minister and chair of the EU Council of Foreign Ministers, Mrs. Susanna Agnelli, that recognition of Belgrade by the EU unless and until the Kosova issue was addressed, would "encourage Belgrade to continue its aggressive policies" and to reject any cooperation towards the resolution of the Kosova issue on the basis of the political will of the people.

Making recognition of Belgrade conditional only on the latter's diplomatic recognition of FYROM, at a time President Milosevic of Serbia has been defying the world with regard to the War Crimes Tribunal, and no progress towards ensuring a negotiated settlement to the critical Kosova issue has been made, is all but a right path to pursue.

Kosova, The Hague Tribunal, as well as the succession of the former Yugoslavia should remain firmly in place, as envisioned in the Dayton accords, to serve as a strong leverage towards making Serbia move in the right direction: pursuit of a comprehensive and lasting solution to all the outstanding issues.

On the contrary, the "outer wall" of international sanctions on Serbia would be torn down. The peace process in this part of the Balkans may end up in a muddle.

Meanwhile, Dr. Bujar Bukoshi, prime minister of the Republic of Kosova told the Albanian section of the BBC radio on Tuesday that the mutual recognition between Belgrade and Skopje does not mean a finished business in the former Yugoslavia.

There are many other outstanding issues, including "the very complex issue of Kosova," Dr. Bukoshi emphasized, adding that the situation in Kosova could further aggravate if the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia is recognized by the world now.

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